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COMMENT
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT:
MORE BRICKBATS AND ANOTHER PROPOSAL
Morris A. Kent, Jr. was arrested for housebreaking, robbery and rape
on September 5, 1961. Because he was only sixteen years old the juvenile
court obtained jurisdiction of his case. Thus began the tortured journey
of one of the most important and instructive cases in the history of juvenile
court litigation in this country. It is presently in its fifth year, having been
remanded to the United States district court by a decision of the Supreme
Court handed down on March 21, 1966.' After beginning in the Juvenile
Court of the District of Columbia, passing through five courts supplying
the subject matter for five opinions culminating in the decision by the
Supreme Court, Kent v. United States has come to represent a catalogue
of the maladies which afflict the juvenile court system.
Kent was under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a probationer
for the two years preceding his arrest. Because of this situation, Kent's
mother feared that the juvenile court might decide to relinquish its jurisdiction so that Kent could be prosecuted as an adult before the district
court. Such a procedure is provided by a District of Columbia statute
which permits waiver of jurisdiction "after full investigation" in the cases
of juveniles over sixteen accused of committing acts considered felonies, or
juveniles accused of committing acts punishable by death or life imprisonment under ordinary criminal procedure.2 Except for the requirement of "full investigation," no standard is set forth in the statute to guide
the juvenile court judge in the exercise of his discretion.
Because of her fear of waiver, Kent's mother obtained an interview
with the director of social work of the juvenile court to persuade against
relinquishment of jurisdiction. Kent's counsel 3 submitted a memorandum
arguing against waiver and a psychiatrist's report concerning his client's
mental condition. With this material and the minor's records before him,
including his social records compiled by the social work staff of the juvenile
court, the juvenile court judge decided to waive jurisdiction on September
12, 1961. The importance of this decision may be appreciated only after
one considers that it could spell the difference between a maximum imprisonment of five years in a juvenile institution and the possibility of the
death penalty or many years of incarceration in an adult prison and daily
' Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966).
2 D.C. CoDE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. V, 1966).

3 Kent had the uncommon advantage of being represented before the juvenile
court. See note 83 infra.
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contact with hardened criminals.
In conceptual terms, the decision to
relinquish jurisdiction moved the juvenile from the rehabilitative philosophy
of the juvenile court to the regular criminal processes, where the notions
of retribution and deterrence play an important role.
In spite of the obvious importance of the decision, the juvenile court
judge did not feel that a hearing was required. Thus Kent's lawyer was
never given an opportunity to argue his case before the court, the minor
had no opportunity to testify in support of his cause and the conclusions
of the social workers, set out in the social record upon which the judge
may have relied, were never subjected to the probing analysis of crossexamination. From the face of the statute, it appears that the legislature
concurred in the court's opinion that a hearing in waiver cases is unnecessary, for it neglected explicitly to require one.5
The problems encountered by Morris Kent did not stop with the
failure to afford him a hearing. The court, in the exercise of its discretion,
refused to permit his social records to be examined either by his lawyer
or by the psychiatrists retained by him. Of course, the lack of a hearing
resulted in the absence of a transcript of proceedings, so there was no way
to determine what factors played a role in the decision. Nor did the
juvenile court judge feel constrained to tell the world the basis of his decision to send Morris Kent to the criminal court. Intoning the words of the
waiver statute, the order of the juvenile court stated cryptically that "after
full investigation" jurisdiction was relinquished. Kent was held for trial
under the regular procedures of the district court, and two weeks later an
indictment for eight offenses was returned against him. At this stage in
the litigation-with no record, no opinion and no indication of the standards
applied to remove him from the juvenile court-Kent entered an appellate
maze seeking reversal of the juvenile court.
Kent pursued two courses of attack; he filed a writ of habeas corpus
in the district court to challenge its jurisdiction, and he appealed the waiver
order to the District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals (now the
4 See Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1049, 1053 (1966). The juvenile court's
jurisdiction over a minor ceases when he becomes twenty-one. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1551 (Supp. V, 1966). When Kent was indicted before the district court he was
charged with rape, which carries a possible death penalty, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2801
(1961), house breaking carrying a fifteen year maximum penalty, D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-1801 (1961), and robbery, carrying a fifteen year maximum penalty. D.C. CODE
ANN. §22-2901 (1961).
Upon conviction in the district court Kent was sentenced to a term of from
thirty to ninety years.
BThe statute reads:
When a child 16 years of age or over is charged with an offense which
if committed by a person 18 years of age or over is a felony, or when a
child under 18 years of age is charged with an offense which if committed by
a person 18 years of age or over is punishable by death or life imprisonment,
a judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order the child
held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have
jurisdiction of the offense if committed by a person 18 years of age or over

D.C.

CODE

ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. V, 1966).
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District of Columbia Court of Appeals) under the general appeal statute.6
On September 19, 1961, the writ of habeas corpus was dismissed without
opinion, and on April 13, 1962, the Municipal Court of Appeals affirmed
the juvenile court in a short opinion, holding that the requirement of full
investigation had been met by the juvenile court and that the lack of
standards in the waiver statute did not violate "fundamental fairness"
concepts of due process.7 Both these judgments were appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which held that habeas
corpus did not lie to attack the jurisdiction of the district court and that
waiver was not a final order and, therefore, could not be appealed to the
Municipal Court of Appeals. 8 The basis of the court's decision was a fear
that attacks on waiver at that stage would cause delay and that the record
was "woefully inadequate." 9 A motion to dismiss the indictment before
the district court was offered as the solution, and such a motion was pending before that court. This last pre-trial appeal was denied on January
22, 1963.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment, Kent proceeded to trial and was found guilty by a jury of three counts of housebreaking and three counts of robbery and not guilty of rape by reason of
insanity.
In October, 1964, the court of appeals finally reached the merits of the
Kent case and affirmed both the waiver and the conviction.'i Responding
to the minor's allegation that the relinquishment of jurisdiction had violated
the philosophy of the juvenile court system, commonly referred to as
parens patriae, the court after three years finally came to grips with the
nature of the process of waiver; the court stated:
We cannot say, from an examination before us, that the Juvenile
Court's waiver in this case was wholly at odds with the parens
patriaephilosophy of the statutory scheme under which that Court
functions. For the system to operate as intended, the Court must
have a wide discretion in both the formulation and the application
of a waiver policy. The reviewing function of the District Court
. . . must necessarily reside within narrow limits and depend,
for its affirmative exercise, upon demonstrable existence of arbitrariness or capriciousness."
The court found specifically that the various reports and the two year experience with Kent as a probationer satisfied the full investigation re6 See In the Matter of Kent, 179 A.2d 727 (D.C. Munic. Ct App. 1962).
7 Ibid.
8 Kent v. Reid, 316 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
9 Id. at 334, 335. It should be noted that the state of the record had not substantially improved when almost two years later the case finally reached the Third
Circuit again for decision on the merits.
1oKent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
11 Id. at 252.
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quirement and the failure to permit counsel to examine the social records
did not constitute deprivation of effective assistance. Tucked away in a
footnote was the suggestion that an opinion by the juvenile court stating
2
the basis for the waiver would be helpful, although not required.' Hardly
a mention was made of the absence of a hearing.
Few, if any, juvenile court cases have been heard by the United States
Supreme Court; however, after the decision of the D.C. Circuit the high
court granted Kent's petition for certiorari and reversed the court of
appeals.' 3 The Court recognized that the juvenile court has considerable
latitude within which to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction,
but held that this latitude did not "confer upon the Juvenile Court a
license for arbitrary procedure," nor would it be permitted to dispense
with "procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness .... " 14
The Supreme Court, however, declined to discuss the constitutional issues
involved in the lax procedures of the juvenile court and confined itself to
an interpretation of the statute in light of decisions of the D.C. Circuit
The Court held that "the statute
which were announced after Kent.
read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and
the assistance of counsel" requires, as a condition of waiver, that the
juvenile court afford the minor a hearing, permit his counsel access to the
juvenile court records and deliver an opinion stating the reasons why a
waiver was effected.' 6 Morris Kent is twenty-one now, too old to be
brought under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. It took five years
and five courts to decide that he was entitled to reasonable procedural protections during a litigation in the juvenile court which was of enormous
consequence to him-protections which would have been afforded adults
7
as a matter of course.
But how much did the Supreme Court really settle in Kent? The
case could not be remanded to the juvenile court for a redetermination of
the waiver because Kent was twenty-one,' 8 but a redetermination under the
new procedural requirements is necessary because it has been held that if
the waiver was unjustified, a subsequent criminal conviction must be
vacated and the indictment dismissed.' 9 Consequently, the Supreme Court
No opinion accompanied the decision. Although none is required by the
statute, a useful purpose might be served in some cases at least by a discussion
of the reasons motivating the determination. Unaided by such a discussion,
our task remains the one of weighing the decision in the light of what the
record discloses.
Id. at 253 n.6. As there was no hearing, it is difficult to understand what the record
could disclose.
13 Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966).
12

14 Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1054-55.
15
6

1 Id.at 1055.
17 Of course, Kent received all the procedural protections afforded an adult during
the litigation in the criminal court.
18 See note 4 supra.
9 See Black v. United States, No. 19038, D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 1965, discussed in
Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045, 1059 (1966).
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felt that it had no alternative but to reverse the court of appeals and the
district court and remand the case to the district court for a de novo hearing to determine whether the waiver, when made, was "inappropriate."
If it should so find, the district court was directed to vacate the conviction. °
This solution raises serious problems, because the Court did not discuss
the standards under which waiver would be permitted except to recognize
the wide latitude of the juvenile court in developing policy in this area.
With only the "full investigation" standard required by statute, the district court is forced to make a basic policy judgment when the juvenile
court, the supposed expert, has no announced policy. Under this state
of affairs it is difficult to understand how the district court will be able
to make a knowledgeable judgment as to whether the waiver was "inappropriate."
The Supreme Court's opinion, therefore, undoubtedly represents an
important advance in affording procedural protections to juvenile offenders
in the District of Columbia and may be a warning to other similarly lax
jurisdictions; 2 1 but it does not reach one important aspect of the problemthe lodging of almost unbridled discretion in the juvenile courts which
permits them to make important decisions concerning criminal offenders
under unannounced criteria. Manifestly, the law of waiver, the basis of
concern in Kent, demonstrates this problem. It is set forth in a statute
2
virtually void of criteria, and a series of similarly unilluminating opinionsY
Must a child be found incorrigible before waiver is permitted, or is the
commission of one serious offense sufficient? Is overcrowding in juvenile
court facilities a relevant or even permissible consideration? To what
extent should the safety of the public be considered as outweighing the
needs of the delinquent? What is the role of deterrence in a decision
to waive? Indeed, what is the purpose behind permitting the juvenile
court to relinquish jurisdiction?23 None of these questions is answered
by the Supreme Court's opinion; yet the Court felt that a remand to an
inexpert court was sufficient to protect the minor against inappropriate
waiver when the expert court had given little indication that it knew what
the appropriate waiver standards were.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Two major themes underly juvenile court philosophy: 1) an adjudication to determine whether a minor is a juvenile delinquent because of the
20
21

Kent v. United States, supra note 19, at 1059.

The Supreme Court has granted a petition for certiorari in a second juvenile

court case. Miller

v. Rhay, No. 38216, Wash. Sup. Ct., June 16, 1965, cert. granted,

34 U.S.L. Week 3341 (U.S. March 4, 1966). Because this case arose from state
court litigation, it may result in a holding concerning constitutional rights in the
juvenile
court.
22
See, e.g., United States v. Green, 308 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Wilhite v.
United States, 281 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Briggs v. United States, 226 F.2d
350 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545 (D.D.C. 1965).
23

For a fuller discussion of the problems encountered in the area of waiver of

jurisdiction, see pp. 1206-12 infra.
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2
alleged commission of criminal acts is not a criminal action, 4 and 2) the
purpose of juvenile court proceedings is the treatment and rehabilitation
n2
The
of the minor rather than the punishment of a criminal offender.
the
of
philosophy
patriae
parens
the
as
latter is generally referred to
finding
adjudication
an
that
notion
the
is
court. An important corollary
the minor to be a juvenile delinquent should not carry the stigma generally associated with conviction of crime 2 and will not result in any of
its disabilities. 2 7 From these underpinnings, novel lines of reasoning flow.
Characterization of juvenile court proceedings as non-criminal and the
philosophy of treatment rather than punishment have caused great inroads
to be made into procedural protections normally afforded criminal
offenders. By calling juvenile court proceedings non-criminal, it is felt
that constitutional safeguards surrounding criminal proceedings may be
ignored.2 8 Thus, the checks on pre-trial police practices, the right of confrontation, the right to counsel, the protection against double jeopardy and
other constitutional protections provided adult offenders are absent. The
parens patriae or treatment philosophy has led to informal procedures of
fact-finding and sentencing because it is asserted that the basis of the
philosophy requires a hearing conceived as "a search for the truth" rather
than a normal criminal trial with its "overly legalistic" or "technical" procedures and rules of evidence. The admission of hearsay testimony and
written reports of social workers is the rule, not the exception. The hoped
for effect of these informal procedures is that in a non-legal atmosphere the
juvenile will be put at ease, and the absence of technical objections by
counsel will expedite the fact-finding process.2 9 The hearing is considered
part of the therapy. On the other hand, it is asserted that a normal criminal
trial will be a traumatic experience for the juvenile, fixing in his own mind
the stigma of criminality.30 Incarceration is considered a last resort only
4 See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; In re
Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 151, 138 P.2d 503, 510 (1943). But see Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNEI.L L.Q. 387, 389 (1961).
25 See, e.g., McLaughlin & McGee, Juvenile Court Procedure, 17 ALA. L. REv.
226 (1965).
26 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 378 (1959) ; D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308 (Supp. V,
1966); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A :4-39 (1952).
27 Under the D.C. Code, the juvenile court adjudication does not disqualify the
minor from civil service positions. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-2308 (Supp. V, 1966).
28 See, e.g., McLaughlin & McGee, supra note 25, at 228-30.
2 The hearing of all cases where children are involved shall be held at a
different time from the hearing of other cases in the probate court. It shall
be the duty of the judge of the court so to conduct the hearing as to disarm
the fears of the child and to win its respect and confidence.
AI.A. CODE tit. 13, § 353 (1958). See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State
Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 790-91 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Harvard Research Project].
3o See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of
Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 10; Rappeport, Determination of Delinquericy in the Juvenile Court: A Suggested Approach, 1958 WASHr, U.L.Q. 123,
•"'
161-62; Harvard Research Project 790-91.
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to be used in cases of repeated or serious offenders; 31 and such incarceration
is not imprisonment in an ordinary penal institution but placement in a
juvenile hall for the purpose of rehabilitation. Although a modest trend in
the direction of greater procedural protection may be discerned in recent
years, many courts remain willing to write the Constitution out of juvenile
proceedings except for the general prohibition against procedures which
violate the "fundamental fairness" concept of due process,3 2 an injunction
which has not proved effective.
Aside from rehabilitation, the desired product of the juvenile court
process is the absence of the stigma usually attached to criminal convictionPm It is rightly felt that no form of treatment can be effective if
the minor, after an adjudication of delinquency, is disabled from assuming
a normal role in society. Thus attempts are made to keep publicity at a
minimum by eliminating the right to public trial 3 and controlling the
exposure of court records.as The opinion of the court of appeals in
Kent exemplifies the restrictive approach taken by some courts toward
the control of court records.3 8 Beyond attempting to suppress publicity,
juvenile court statutes generally do away with the official disabilities which
37
ordinarily result from criminal conviction.
Although it is difficult to argue with the genuine humanitarian goals
of the juvenile court system, the disparity between the formulation of the
ideal and the reality of the system is cause for great concern. The thesis
31

a) When the court finds that the child comes within the provisions of this
subchapter . . . it may by order duly entered:

(1) place the child on probation or under supervision in his own home
or in the custody of a relative or other fit person, upon such terms
as the court determines;

(2) commit the child to the Board of Commissioners of the District of
Columbia or its authorized representative; or to the National Training School for Boys if in need of such care as is given in the school;
or to a qualified suitable private institution or agency willing and

able to assume the education, care, and maintenance of the child
without expense to the public; or
(3) make such further disposition of the child as may be provided by law
and as the court deems to be best for the best interests of the child.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection do not authorize the removal
of the child from the custody of his parents unless his welfare and the safety
and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without the
removal.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308 (Supp. V, 1966).
32 See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943). But see Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct.

1045 (1966).
33 See notes 26 & 27 supra.
3
4 See notes 73 & 74 infra and accompanying text.
35

See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 257-58 (D.C. Cir. 1964). However,
even before the Supreme Court reversed in Kent, the court of appeals had changed its
8

6

attitude, evidencing great liberality in permitting inspection by the juvenile's attorney.

See Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278, 280-81 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
3
7 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 378 (1958) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308 (Supp. V,
1966) ; N.J. RE. STAT. § 2A:4-39 (1952).
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of this Comment is that the procedural protections established to realize
the goal of the system are inadequate and unfair. The starting point of
analysis is the assertion that by changing the name of the proceedings
and characterizing them as non-criminal we may not do away with the
procedural protections afforded those who stand in jeopardy of being deprived of their liberty. While this idea is not new, and much of the material
to be discussed concerning the current state of juvenile court law has been
the subject of articles elsewhere, it is hoped that further elucidation will

give support to a forthcoming proposal to incorporate procedural safeguards in the juvenile court scheme while preserving its basic goals.s
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Jurisdiction
Generally there are three types of cases brought before juvenile and
family courts: dependency and neglect cases generally involving fault on
the part of the parents; incorrigibility and waywardness cases which usually
involve fault of the minor but where the acts committed do not rise to the
status of crimes-e.g., cases involving truancy or association with undesirables; and delinquency proceedings involving acts which, if committed
by an adult, would be considered crimes.5 9 It may well be that custody
or wardship procedures are adequate in fact to deal with the first two
categories of cases, although this problem is not dealt with here and no
conclusions are offered. However, under most juvenile court statutes two
or more of these types of cases are lumped under one jurisdictional section.
Thus section 2A :4-14 of the New Jersey statute states:
[T]he juvenile and domestic relations court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all cases of juvenile

delinquency.
Juvenile delinquency is hereby defined as the commission by
a child under 18 years of age
28 The arguments made are avowedly one-sided in the sense that this Comment
is devoted to advocating greater procedural protections in the juvenile courts, and the
contrary position is not fully developed. It is felt that such development is not
required because much has been written in legal journals concerning the reasoning
behind establishing informal juvenile court procedures, see, e.g., Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HAxv. L. REv. 104 (1910), and the body of case law is large. Thus, this
Comment is conceived as merely an addition to a continuing dialogue concerning the
efficacy of current juvenile court procedures and not as a complete statement of all
the arguments which have been put forward either supporting or attacking those
procedures.
Detailed discussion of the type of treatment dispensed by juvenile authorities
will not be attempted, nor will there be an evaluation of the success of the methods
utilized. The juvenile institutions of incarceration will not be examined except where
necessary to demonstrate how the ideal departs from the actual. As a research tool,
the juvenile court law of four jurisdictions was examined in depth: Alabama, California, District of Columbia and New Jersey. Cases and statutes from other jurisdictions are utilized to document specific points.
39 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958).
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(1) of any act which when committed by a person of the age
of 18 years or over would constitute:
a. A felony, high misdemeanor, misdemeanor, or other
offense, or
b. The violation of any penal law or municipal ordinance, or
c. Any act or offense for which he could be prosecuted
in the method partaking of the nature of a criminal
action or proceeding, or
d. Being a disorderly person, or
(2) of the following acts:
e. Habitual vagrancy, or
f. Incorrigibility, or
g. Immorality, or
h. Knowingly associating with thieves or vicious or immoral persons, or
i. Growing up in idleness or delinquency, or
j. Knowingly visiting gambling places, or patronizing
other places or establishments, his admission to which
constitutes a violation of law, or
k. Idly roaming the streets at night, or
1. Habitual truancy from school, or
m. Deportment endangering the morals, health or gen40
eral welfare of said child.
Similarly, section 350 of the Alabama code places the categories of "delinquent children," "neglected children" and "dependent children" under
one jurisdictional section.4 1 The difficulty with not differentiating the
jurisdiction of the courts over delinquency proceedings having criminal
acts as their bases from their jurisdiction over wardship proceedings is the
tendency to consider the same types of procedures adequate to deal with a
variety of situations, some of which clearly are non-criminal in nature.
While informal procedures may be sufficient in the case of a child who does
not choose to go to school regularly, entirely different considerations should
42
apply to the development of procedures to deal with a juvenile murderer.
Legislatures may be reaching an awareness of this problem. The
California juvenile court law, redrafted in 1961, differentiates among three
REv. STAT. § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1965).
See note 39 supra.

40 NJ.
41

42

See Rappeport, supra note 30, at 123-25.
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categories of cases, utilizing three distinct sections to define them.O
Throughout the act procedural requirements are established to deal separately with each of the three types of cases, and greater caution is employed when the case concerns offenses criminal in nature. 44
A jurisdictional age limit of under eighteen years is most common
for juvenile court statutes 4 5 Some courts interpret their statutes as requiring only that the juvenile have been under that age at the time of the
alleged offense, while others hold that once the juvenile reaches eighteen
However, the jurisdictional age limit is
the court loses its jurisdiction."
not universally set at eighteen. Alabama grants the juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction only over minors under sixteen,47 but ordinary criminal
courts are permitted to transfer sixteen or seventeen year old minors
brought before them to the juvenile court if they deem such transfer "to
48
Under
be in the interest of justice and of the public welfare .... ,,
43

Any person under the age of 21 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control
and has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to
exercise or capable of exercising such care or control . ...
(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of
life, or who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode, or
whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty, or
depravity of either of his parents, or of his guardian or other person in
whose custody or care he is.
(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of mental or
physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 600.
Any person under the age of 21 years who persistently or habitually refuses
to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian,
custodian or school authorities, or who is beyond the control of such person,
or any person who is a habitual truant from school within the meaning of
any law of this State, or who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle,
dissolute, lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELFRE & INST'NS CODE §601.

Any person under the age of 21 years who violates any law of this State or of
the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this State defining
crime or who, after having been found by the juvenile court to be a person
described by Section 601, fails to obey any lawful order of the juvenile court,
is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person
to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELFARE & IN5T'Ns CODE § 602.
44 For example, to support a finding that a minor is a person described in § 602,
a preponderance of evidence legally admissible in the trial of a criminal case must be
adduced, while in cases falling under §§ 600 and 601, a preponderance of the evidence
legally admissible in civil cases must be adduced.

CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE

§ 701.

45

E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1551, 16-2301 (Supp. V, 1966); N.J. REV.

STAT.

§ 2A :4-14 (Supp. 1965).

46 See Rappeport, supra note 30, at 139-45.
47

tit. 13, § 350 (1958).
ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 363 (1958). See Davis v. State, 259 Ala. 212, 66 So. 2d
714 (1953), construing this provision and demonstrating the wide discretion lodged
in the criminal court judge.
48

ALA. CODE
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California law the juvenile courts have jurisdiction of all criminal offenders
under twenty-one,49 but they have exclusive jurisdiction only of those
under eighteen at the time of the offense. 50 In fact, rarely, if ever, are
persons eighteen or over tried in the juvenile court, and the provision
allowing certification to the juvenile court of those eighteen to twenty-one
is apparently never exercised.
Although the problem of jurisdictional age limits is not the most
crucial issue facing the juvenile courts, and the under eighteen cut-off
seems perfectly reasonable, the experience in California concerning discretionary transfer would seem to demonstrate an important tendency on
the part of regular judges dealing with the juvenile court system. It must
be assumed that the legislature had some purpose in mind when it enacted
the discretionary transfer section, yet the section has been totally ignored.
Presumably this is in part due to a distrust by regular judges of the
processes of the juvenile court, and is also partially attributable to the
vagueness of the statute, which provides no standard to guide the exercise
of discretion. '
B. Pre-trialPractices

There are two ways by which minors are brought under the processes
of the juvenile court. After the police refer an alleged delinquent to the
juvenile authorities, usually members of the social work or probation
officer's staff, these authorities investigate the propriety of prosecuting an
action against the minor. If they decide that further action is appropriate,
a petition is filed in the juvenile court.52 The alternative route is certification from a regular criminal court, usually following discovery that the
juvenile is within the age limits of exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction. 3
Once the minor is brought under the court's jurisdiction, statutes, although
sometimes in a sketchy manner, spell out procedures leading to a hearing
and judgment 4 However, procedures to guide police in their handling
of juveniles from the time of apprehension until the case is referred to the
juvenile court officials are virtually non-existent. While a detailed discussion of police practices regarding juveniles will not be attempted, 5
certain aspects of the relationship of the police to juveniles require mention.
49

See note 43 supra.

CAL. WELFARE & INsT'Ns CODE § 604 permits a judge of a criminal court to
certify persons under twenty-one years to the juvenile court. However, minors
eighteen or older are prosecuted in criminal courts as a matter of course. Harvard
Research Project 793 n.83; Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A Policy
Statement, 8 CRnmE & DELINQUENCY 3, 8 (1962).
51 Section 604 states merely that a criminal court is permitted to certify transfer
cases, but it offers no standard by which to decide when cases are to be certified.
62 See, e.g., D.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-2302 (Supp. V, 1966).
65 34 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 363 (1958) ; CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 604.
For a statute establishing detailed procedures after referral, see CAL. WELFARE
-o

& IN STNS CODE
55

§§ 624-64.

This area was well described in the HarvardResearch Project.
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Large numbers of juveniles apprehended by the police on suspicion
of minor offenses are never brought under the juvenile court processes.
A Harvard field study found that police operate ad hoc juvenile court hearings, releasing confessed violators with only an admonishment.P0 The
threat of referrals is used to induce confession. Thus, the juvenile court
never deals with the great mass of offenders. Presumably the serious
offenders and those who do not confess are referred to the juvenile court
authorities. The problem of coerced or illegal confessions obtained from
serious offenders during the period from apprehension to referral is of
greatest concern.
The most concrete evidence of coercive police practices is the extraordinary number of confessions given in the station house; 5 it has been
estimated that in ninety-nine per cent of juvenile court cases the suspect
has made a confession. In 3,000 consecutive cases in one court over a
two year period only five accused juveniles wholly denied involvement, 58
although this figure may include some who admitted guilt at the hearing
without having given a prior confession to the police. Presently, the importance of illegally obtained confessions is not as great as might be felt
initially, since most juveniles apparently also admit involvement at the
hearing-the juvenile equivalent to a guilty plea. Only where the juvenile
recants from a confession given to the police is the issue of illegal confessions brought into focus. As the incidence of representation of juveniles
by counsel increases, fewer guilty pleas may be expected, and standards
governing the admissibility of confessions may become the most crucial
issue facing the juvenile courts.
No definite answer may be offered to the question whether these confessions are the result of superior police investigation or police overbearing.
However, one can point with certainty to the fact that the protections
against coerced confessions are substantially fewer than in an adult court.
No provision is made for a pre-trial hearing to suppress coerced confessions, as is provided in federal and most state jurisdictions. And even
if there were, the infrequency of representation by counsel 51 would severely
hamper the juvenile in his attempt to exclude the confession. Under
present procedures the juvenile's claim of coercion raises an issue of fact
to be decided at the hearing.0°
The strongest argument against the need for greater protections from
coerced confessions proceeds from the observation that juveniles are not
tried before juries, and a judge will be able to exclude an unreliable confession from his mind when making his factual findings. There are several
reasons why this suggestion does not offer the juvenile sufficient protection.
While it is true that an appellate court will not uphold a judgment based
56

Harvard Research Project 780-81.
See Handler, sipra note 30, at 19; Harvard Research Project 779-81, 794.
58
Handler, supra note 30, at 19.
59 See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
60 See Robinson v. State, 204 S.W2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
57
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solely on a coerced confession, the nature of the appellate process makes
it difficult to demonstrate actual reliance by the lower court judge if the
record contains other supporting evidence. Thus, in a case where the
evidence aside from the coerced confession is not conclusive, there is always
a danger that the unlawful confession may have actually convinced the
court, yet if the other evidence is substantial, appellate courts apparently
will not reverse. 0 ' Under normal criminal procedure the defendant has a
means of substantially removing this danger-the right to demand trial
by jury. The Supreme Court has required the states to provide procedures
whereby a confession attacked by the defendant will not be placed in evidence before the jury until the question of legality is decided by the judge. 2
Thus the trier of fact is never exposed to a coerced confession. The
juvenile offender is not granted this protection because he generally has
no right to trial by jury.
While there are great barriers facing the juvenile attempting to prove
his confession was coerced, at least the courts have recognized that confessions proven coerced should not be given probative weight by the trier
of fact. The same may not be said of confessions obtained under circumstances not truly coercive which would normally cause the confession to be
suppressed under interpretations of the federal or state constitutions.
Case law in this area is sparse, presumably because of the general belief
that juvenile courts are non-criminal and that constitutional protections
accorded criminal defendants are not relevant. Coerced confessions as a
matter of evidence are considered unreliable and therefore are to be given
no weight, but such is not the case where the confession would be admitted
in a criminal trial but for a violation of the rule of Miranda v. Arizona."
Because it has been held that no constitutional issue is present, confessions
which are the product of police illegality are admissible and are given full
weight because there is little question of their reliability as a matter of
evidence. Under this analysis, a Texas court held that a confession
obtained while the minor was illegally under arrest and not advised of his
right to counsel as required by Texas law was not suppressible on those
grounds alone, and proof of actual coercion was required. 5
The problem of excluding illegal confessions is more acute than that
faced when we are dealing with coerced admissions, since illegal confessions,
once admitted, are reliable evidence. One of the important bases for
excluding confessions in criminal cases where the defendant was deprived
of his constitutional rights, as under the Miranda rule, is the suppression
61 Cf. notes 138-40 infra and accompanying text.
62 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
63

See notes 77 & 78 infra and accompanying text.

U.S.L. W=_a 4521 (U.S. June 13, 1966).
This being a civil proceeding, it was immaterial whether he was under
arrest, legal or illegal, at the time the confession was made. While there was
some evidence that coercion or intimidation was used in its procurement;
such evidence was sufficient only to raise a fact question on that issue.
Robinson v. State, 204 S.W.2d 981, 982 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
0434

65
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of illegal police practices. It seems strange indeed that adult criminal
offenders are given great protection while their younger counterparts
receive little. Beyond this it must be considered that the decision to admit
a confession may be the most crucial question in a criminal trial or a
juvenile court hearing. Constitutional strictures are placed on police practices relating to the procurement of confessions so that fairness to the
alleged criminal offender will be guaranteed. In the area of coerced confessions, procedural protections are established for fear that without them
the innocent may be convicted. Much of the law concerning restrictions
on the admissibility of illegal confessions may be explained in terms of
protecting the defendant from confessions obtained under circumstances
where coercion may be likely but where it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove coercion. The fear of admitting these types of confessions should be no less real in the juvenile court and the procedural
restrictions no less stringent. 0
Problems concerning illegal searches and seizures have almost never
been litigated in the juvenile court context. This may be explained by
the frequency of confessions and the general belief that constitutional
standards concerning search problems do not apply in such courts. However, a New York court has recently said that such standards, including
the exclusionary rules, do apply in the juvenile court.0 7 The D.C. Circuit
has held that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to
juvenile court proceedings, 8 but it is not clear whether .the court meant to
exclude additionally the body of law concerning illegal searches and seizures.
If greater restrictions are placed on the use of confessions, and especially
if juries become more common in juvenile court cases, additional problems
may be expected in this area.
C. The HearingProcess
Earlier the justifications for informality in the hearing process were
discussed. The arguments put forward for informality---expedited fact6

6 The recent New York Family Court Act provides new protection against the
indiscriminate use of confessions:
(b) Any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that
a respondent did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the
evidence. For this purpose, an uncorroborated confession made out of court
by a respondent is not sufficient.
N.Y. FAmY CT. AcT § 744(b).
67 1 can think of few worse examples to set for our children than to visit upon
children what would be, if they were older, unreasonable and unconstitutional
invasions of their all-too-limited privacy and rights, merely because they are
young. In this sense, our proceedings are not "civil." They are perhaps, for
this purpose, "quasi-criminal" in character. . . . Young persons have the
same constitutional rights as older ones in delinquency and supervision jurisdiction, except the right to a jury trial ....
In the Matter of Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 210, 243 N.Y.S.2d 844, 860 (Family Ct.
1963).
6
8 Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Pee v. United
States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United States v. White, 153 F. Supp.
809 (D.D.C. 1957).
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finding, the therapeutic value to the minor of informal hearings and the
absence of the traumatic experience inherent in an ordinary criminal trial,
and its attendant stigma of criminality-have carried the day. Before
challenging the validity of these assumptions, an examination of the effect
informality has had on the hearing and fact-finding process will be made
to determine, conceding the arguments for informality to be valid, whether
on balance they are outweighed by the detrimental effects which also flow
from informal procedures. While so doing, it is important to note that
there is a slight trend away from informality which will be subsequently
examined.
The basis for informal hearings is usually statutory. An extreme
example is the admonishment contained in the Alabama code: "It shall be
the duty of the judge of the court so to conduct the hearing as to disarm
the fears of the child and to win its respect and confidence." 19 More
common is the direction to conduct the hearing in an informal manner or
not to conduct it as a criminal trial. 70 However, a significant step was
taken in the drafting of the new California code which states: "Except
where there is a contested issue of fact or law, the proceedings shall be
conducted in an informal non-adversary atmosphere with a view to obtaining the maximum cooperation of the minor upon whose behalf the petition
is brought . . . ." 71 Coupled with liberal provisions providing for appointment of counsel,72 this section may represent the germinal development
of formal, adversary criminal trials in the juvenile court.
1. Public Trials
It is almost universally accepted that there is no right to public hearings in juvenile courts. 73 Statutes generally provide that only persons
having a direct interest in the case and officials of the court may be present
at the hearings. Some jurisdictions also permit the judge to open the
hearing to "such other persons as he deems to have a legitimate interest
in the case or the work of the court." 74 The justification for dispensing
with the right to public trial is usually said to be the protection of the child.
It is a means of suppressing publicity during the adjudication and thereby
limiting the stigma of criminality. Another possible reason is that public
69 ALA. CODE

tit. 13, § 353 (1958).

70 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (Supp. V,
an informal manner); N.J. RULES 6:9-3-(C)

criminal trial).
71 C- WELARE & INsT''NS

CODE

§ 680.
§8 633,

1966)

(hearings may be conducted in
(hearing shall not be conducted as

(Emphasis added.)
658, 659, 700.

72

CAL. WELPARE & INST'NS CODE

73

ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 353 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (Supp. V, 1966;

N.Y. FAmY CT.AcT § 742; N.J. RULES 6 :9-3-(c).
74 The general public shall be excluded from the hearing and only such persons as have a direct interest in the case and their representatives may be
admitted except that the judge presiding at the hearing, by rule of court or
special order, may admit such other persons as he deems to have a legitimate
interest in the case or the work of the court.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (Supp. V, 1966).
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pressure will not so readily be brought to bear on the court to deal harshly
but unwisely with serious offenders. The thought is that behind closed
doors the informal procedure will work quietly and effectively.
While there may be validity to the fears that open hearings with
attendant publicity could stigmatize the juvenile as a criminal, thus severely
hampering his efforts to reenter society, there are other considerations
which should be taken into account before public trials for juveniles are
blithely eliminated. Most courts would dismiss the constitutional questions,
stressing the non-criminal nature of juvenile court proceedings. But this
argument does not answer the questions raised by the policies underlying
the right to public trial. In a system which exalts informality, where
procedural protections are slim, the danger of "star chamber" proceedings
removed from public scrutiny is substantial. 7
Under present law there
is no way in which the juvenile can protect himself from non-public injustice in the juvenile court. The exception to the rule is the California
code which provides for a private hearing unless the juvenile or his parent
or guardian requests that the proceeding be public.76 The California solution, while in theory granting the juvenile a right to public trial, unfortunately places on him the burden of asking for it. By requesting an open
hearing the juvenile may in effect be voicing a fear as to the fairness of
a private proceeding conducted by the presiding judge. It is doubtful that
many litigants in the juvenile court would request a public hearing at the
risk of having such a request interpreted as a criticism of the presiding
judge. If instead legislatures provide a waivable right to public proceedings rather than public proceedings on request, most of the concerns mentioned above would be satisfied. Those who fear closed-door treatment
automatically would be granted a public trial, while if it is felt that publicity
resulting from the hearing would jeopardize the juvenile's chances for
reentering society, a private hearing may be requested.
2. Trial by Jury
The prevailing opinion at the present time is that there is no constitutional right to jury trial in juvenile courts, 7 1 and the great majority of
statutes do not make provision for juries. 78 Apparently, this is felt to be
75
For an illustration of this danger, see Green v. State, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108
N.E.2d 647 (1952).

^76 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 676.
77 Ex parte State ex rel. Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 356, 17 So. 2d 449, 450 (1944);

People ex -el. Weber v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955) ; Wissenberg
v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1930); Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398,
408, 413-14, 118 So. 184, 186, 187-88 (1928). In the Matter of Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d
194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Family Ct. 1963), held that minors before the juvenile court
have the same constitutional rights as adults except for the right to trial by jury,
"which is balanced by our circumscribed power and the confidentiality here maintained
in an7 effort to keep the record of a child unblemished." Id. at 210, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
8 New Jersey law specifically provides for hearings in the juvenile court without
jury, N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:4-35 (1952), and if a minor of sixteen or seventeen
demands jury trial, the case is referred to the prosecutor for regular criminal proceedings. N.J. REv. STAT. §2A :4-15 (1952).
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consistent with the desired informal procedures; even California, a jurisdiction which has retreated somewhat from informality, makes no provision
for trial by jury. The District of Columbia is a notable exception. Its
statute provides: "The court shall hear and determine all cases of children
without a jury unless a jury is demanded by the child, his parent, guardian,
or the court." 79 Especially significant is the provision whereby the court
itself may provide for a jury trial, a provision which could be helpful in
cases of younger children or minors with lower intelligence charged with
serious offenses and those who are orphans or whose parents are uninterested. However, the entire jury provision has been given a crippling
interpretation by the Municipal Court of Appeals. 0 In a proceeding where
two infants were found to be without adequate parental care and were
committed to the Board of Public Welfare, a parent assigned as error the
refusal of the juvenile court to grant a request for a jury trial. The
municipal court affirmed, finding no constitutional right because the proceeding was non-criminal and not at common law. Interpreting the statute,
the court said:
If the statute, as some statutes do, clearly gives the right to a
jury trial, then of course the court would have no right to deny
it. However, our statute does not clearly say that the right to
jury trial shall be had in all cases of children. It specifically says
trial shall be without a jury "unless a jury be demanded by the
child, his parent, or guardian or the court." We do not believe
that Congress intended in this indirect way to make a sweeping
grant of the right of jury trial to all persons involved in cases
involving children. Had it intended to make so drastic a change,
we feel it would have said so in a plainer and more direct manner . . . . Our conclusion is that the statute did not enlarge
the right to trial by jury but only preserved it where a constitutional right to jury trial exists, provided seasonable demand
therefor is made.8 '
The dissent called this a judicial repeal.8 Because it is generally held that
there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in the juvenile court, the
court's analysis is the equivalent of stating that there is no right to jury
trial under the statute. Apparently because of the large number of confessions given at hearings, the need for jury trials has not seemed acute,
and there is no reported instance where a litigant has challenged the municipal court's interpretation.
Apart from the question of constitutional requirements, trial by jury
should be provided as a matter of policy for those who desire it as a pro79 D.C. CODE

ANN. § 16-2307 (Supp. V, 1966) ; see A. CODE: tit. 13, § 354 (1958).
In re Lambert, 86 A.2d 411 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952).
81 Id. at 412.
80
82

Id. at 414.
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tection against jaded judges who hear case after case, day in and day out,
and decide on past prejudices rather than present evidence. Also present
is the previously discussed problem of excluding illegal or coerced confessions. Under current procedures the same judge who must decide
the case is also asked to rule on the legality of the confession. Of course,
in an ordinary criminal case tried by a judge without jury, he might be
asked to do the same thing. But in a criminal case the defendant chooses
whether trial will be by jury. If he fears prejudice in having the trier of
fact hear the confession, even if it is eventually proved illegal, he may
protect himself by asking for a jury. The danger of this kind of prejudice
would seem to be most substantial where the litigant does not claim actual
coercion but merely that the confession was obtained under illegal circumstances. This problem could be solved by the use of pre-trial procedures
to exclude illegal confessions, using a system of rotating judges so that
the same man does not sit on both the pre-trial and the fact-finding hearings. Of course in the many areas where there are only one-judge juvenile
courts, judges from the regular legal system would be required to hear the
pre-trial claims concerning illegal confession. The need for these complicated procedures could be obviated by offering trial by jury. It should
be noted also that while a two-judge procedure could effectively exclude an
illegal confession from consideration by the trier of fact, it does not satisfy
the concern raised about prejudiced or jaded judges.
3. The Right to Counsel
It is in the area of right to counsel that the developments in the law
of juvenile courts have been most striking. In the majority of juvenile
court cases, probably in the vast majority, the minor is not represented. 8 3
However, in some jurisdictions, both by statute and case law, the right to
counsel is being granted the criminal offender in the juvenile court. These
developments are not particularly surprising because of the extreme disability facing minors trying to defend themselves without aid in a court
of law.84
83 In most of the courts studied in the HarvardResearch Project,attorneys appear
for juveniles in no more than 5% of the cases. However, a Boston judge estimated
that minors were represented in 35% to 40% of juvenile court cases. In San Francisco
it was estimated that attorneys were present in 30% of the cases, but this figure is
probably explained by the liberal provisions of the California code relating to appointment of counsel. In New York, since the introduction of the law guardian system
under the new Family Court Act, attorneys are present in the great majority of cases.
Harvard Research Project 796.
84In re Mikkelsen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1964), demonstrates
one of the pitfalls faced by a minor before the court who was represented by counsel.
At the hearing, the minor's counsel and psychiatrist were present. After the clerk
read the allegations in the petition charging the minor with wilful and lewd exposure

of "his person and private parts in the presence of others . . .

,"

the minor in response

to the judge's question admitted the truth of the facts stated. The court then stated,
"The petition is sustained," followed by counsel's objection: "We don't intend to
waive the right to have evidence introduced. I think that [the minor] .. . . admits
that he exposed himself. Now, lewdly, and the different parts of it, I don't know
that that is the fact but the physical facts happened and we want to cooperate with
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Preliminarily, it must be noted that the government is frequently
without the services of counsel in juvenile court cases. Without the
presence of lawyers the hearing takes on a decidedly non-adversary aspect.
As has been pointed out, most juveniles confess, and once guilt is admitted
the hearing is over.8 5 When the juvenile denies guilt in some jurisdictions
the judge assumes the role of prosecutor, defense attorney and finder of
fact; in questioning the juvenile from the bench he must determine the
validity of the petition, safeguard the child's rights, such as they are, and
make a final judgment.8 6 Recognizing that such a system makes the
judge's prime function-that of fact finder-much more difficult, various
alternatives have been utilized: the probation officer working with the
juvenile does the questioning, or a representative of the police may be
present.87 He may be the officer who arrested the minor, a special prosecuting officer of the juvenile division or police counsel. In a few jurisdictions a representative of the district attorney's office tries juvenile court
cases.88 Regardless of the alternative used, the juvenile charged with a
criminal act requires counsel fully to protect his rights and to mount an
adequate defense.8 9 The need is underscored when the extremely large
number of confessions given to the police by juveniles is recalled, for without counsel the chance of a youth under eighteen proving his confession
coerced or illegal seems nil.
In the appointment of counsel for indigent juvenile criminal offenders,
two of the most advanced jurisdictions are New York and California.
Under the New York law guardian system, established by the Family
Court Act of 1962, on request of the minor or his parents or guardian the
court must appoint counsel if the minor is not independently able to retain
a lawyer.o The act requires informing the minor or parent of the right
your procedures but we don't want to waive any rights we may have, is all." The
judge immediately responded, "The petition is sustained and wardship is declared."
Id. at 469, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
Apparently the juvenile court judge acted on the notion that admission of the
facts of a petition constitutes a guilty plea, even though counsel was attempting to
put in a defense. The appellate court reversed, finding it a violation of due process
to deprive the minor of the right to introduce evidence. Ibid. However, without
counsel this objection probably never would have been raised, and even with counsel
present, it required an appellate court decision before a defense was permitted to be
raised.
S5 This rule is demonstrated in In re Mikkelsen, supra note 84. See In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 377 P.2d 74, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1962) (admission of the charges
equivalent to a guilty plea).
86 See N.J. RULES 6:9-1(c) ; Harvard Research Project 795-96.
S7 Ibid.
88 Ibid. New Jersey provides prosecutors in homicide cases. N.J. RULES 6:9-1 (g).
89 See note 84 spra.
00 N.Y. FAm y CT. Acr §§ 241-49. It has been suggested that an attorney appointed
to represent a juvenile before the family court may not be placed in a purely adversary
role. For example, the best interests of the child may dictate that an attorney disclose
evidence adverse to his client or that a particular right not be asserted in every
instance. See Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New York: Juvenile Cases in
the New Family Court, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 508-11 (1963). However, a conversation
with a staff member of the Law Guardian Division of the New York Legal Aid
Society revealed that such suggestions have not been followed and appointed counsel
under the New York act assume an adversary role. -
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to counsel 9 1 and permits the court on its own motion to make an appointment without request.9 2 Under California law if the minor, parent or
guardian desires counsel and is indigent, the court must make an appointment if the juvenile is charged with a criminal act which if committed by
an adult would be considered a felony, and in all other cases the court
may appoint counsel if requested.9 3 In cases where a conflict of interest appears between parent and child, the court may make additional
appointmentsY4
Without statutory provision the juvenile has been hard pressed in his
attempts to convince the courts that he should be given a right to counsel.
The experience in California prior to the new code is instructive. In re
Contreras,35 decided in 1952, seems to be the first decision under modern
California law holding that a juvenile has a right to counsel in a juvenile
court. Contesting the denial of his motion to appoint counsel, Contreras
appealed an order of the juvenile court finding him to be a juvenile delinquent on a charge of assault with a deadly weapon and committing him to
a juvenile institution. A state court of appeals, in reversing the judgment,
held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion, on two grounds:
the transcript contained evidence admitted during the hearing which the
court felt could have been excluded by objection at trial, and the litigation
in the juvenile court resulting in the deprivation of liberty was indistinguishable from a criminal action where the right to counsel is preserved.96
However, three years later another California court refused to reverse a
finding of delinquency and order of commitment because of a failure to
appoint or notify of the right to counsely 7 The ground of decision was
the "non-criminal" rubric, and Contreras was distinguished as reversing
8
the lower court because it had acted "entirely on incompetent evidence." 9
91 N.Y. FAmILy CT. Acr § 741.
12 N.Y.FAMILY CT. Acr § 249.
The minor or his parent must be
93 CAL. WLARE & INST'NS CODE § 634.
informed of the right to counsel. CAL. WEL-FAaE & INST'NS CODE §§ 633, 700; see
In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 377 P.2d 74, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1962). Appointed
counsel is awarded reasonable compensation paid out of a county general fund. CAL.
WLFARE & INST'eNS CODE § 517.
94 CAL. WmARE & INST'7NS CODE

§ 634.

95 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
96
Countering the claim that there is no right to counsel in the juvenile court
because of the non-criminal nature of the adjudication, the court said:
It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon a
charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the
character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor. Let
him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or obtain a position
of honor and trust and he is immediately confronted with his juvenile court
record. And further, as in this case, the minor is taken from his family,
deprived of his liberty and confined in a state institution. True, the design
of the Juvenile Court Act is intended to be salutory, and every effort should
be made to further its legitimate purpose; but never should it be made an

instrument for the denial to a minor of a constitutional right or of a guarantee afforded by law to an adult.

Id. at 789-90, 241 P2d at 633.
97 People ex rel. Weber v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955).
98 Id. at 743, 289 P.2d at 305.
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This, of course, was a clear misrepresentation of the grounds of decision
in Contreras. The reference to evidence in that case was merely that
evidence was introduced which could have been excluded by counsel's
objection, not that there was no competent evidence. The second ground
of decision in Contreraswas basically ignored, although implicitly rejected,
in the later case. During the next year Contreraswas again shoved aside
in People v. Dotson,99 a waiver of jurisdiction case. Again the supposed
non-criminal nature of juvenile court proceedings was given as justification for refusal to appoint counsel. Contreras was again distinguished
but not on the evidence ground alone. The appellate court felt that
because Contrerasdealt with a dispositive hearing, resulting in the deprivation of the juvenile's liberty, it was distinguishable from the case before
it where guilt was not at issue and the only question was whether the
minor was a fit subject for juvenile court action. 10° Apparently not considered was the fact that following waiver Dotson was tried and convicted
of murder in a regular court, and he claimed not to have resisted waiver
because he never understood what was at stake. Dotson was followed
by In re Garcia,10 1 decided in 1962, involving a judgment of delinquency
based on the commission of a homicide. In refusing reversal the court
merely announced that the denial occurred at a hearing which took place
before the 1961 act was passed and that there is no constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed in juvenile court. Such was the state of
California law prior to legislative revision.
In the District of Columbia the first breakthrough came in Shoutakon
v. District of Columbia,10 2 decided in 1956. A judgment of juvenile delinquency for auto theft and a commitment to a training school was set
aside by the D.C. Circuit for failure to advise of the right to counsel
or to appoint counsel. However, the court declined to base its decision
on constitutional grounds, limiting itself to a construction of the statute.
The serious nature and effect of this adjudication suggests
that Congress could not have been unaware of the need for effective assistance of counsel. Although that Act in terms neither
recognizes nor withholds such assistance, the legislative history
reflects congressional understanding that alleged delinquents
would be represented by counsel. . . . The "right to be heard"
when personal liberty is at stake requires the effective assistance
of counsel in a juvenile court as much as it does in a criminal
03

court.1

It should not go unnoticed that during the previous year it was held in a
much ignored district court opinion, In re Poff,10 4 that due process requires
19 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
loo Id. at 895-96, 299 P.2d at 878.
101201 Cal. App. 2d 662, 20 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1962).
102236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
lo Id. at 669.
104 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C 1955).
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that a juvenile must be advised of his right to counsel whenever he is
charged with an offense before the juvenile court which "if committed by
an adult would constitute a crime .... ,"105

In 1960 the Legal Aid Act

was passed requiring the Legal Aid Agency to make attorneys available to
represent indigents "in proceedings before the juvenile court .... " 106

A

recent case has interpreted this statute to require appointment of counsel
to represent a minor while the juvenile court is deliberating whether it
should waive its jurisdiction. 107
Other jurisdictions are not so advanced. Under the rules governing
the New Jersey courts a juvenile is entitled to be represented by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings, 08 but in the case of indigents the court
is required to appoint counsel only in homicide hearings ;109 in all other
cases discretion is lodged with the juvenile court judge to appoint counsel
"where necessary for a fair hearing . . .". 110

While "attornies have

always been welcome in the Calhoun City Juvenile Court," 111 Alabama
makes no provision for the appointment of counsel to represent indigent
juveniles before its juvenile courts. The court has discretion to call in
lawyers to assist in the proceedings, but it seems to be exercised only in
bastardy cases." 2
Lest one become overly encouraged by recent developments, a 1962
California Supreme Court case decided after the new act became law is a
poignant reminder that great battles are not easily won in the juvenile
court area.113 Section 633 of the act requires that when a minor appears
at a pre-trial detention hearing he, and his parent if present, be informed
of the right to counsel. Section 658 provides that notice of the hearing
on the petition must be served upon the minor's parents, and section 659
requires notice that the parent is entitled to have an attorney present and,
if indigent, to have counsel appointed if desired. Section 700 provides
that at the beginning of the fact-finding hearing the judge shall ascertain
whether the minor or'his parent has been informed of the right to counsel
0 5

Id. at 227. It has also been held that a waiver of counsel must be intelligently
made. "The latter implies that where a waiver is relied on, the Juvenile Court must
affirmatively find as a fact that by reason of 'age, education, and information, and
all pertinent facts' the minor is able to and did make an intelligent waiver." McBride
v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Thus some minors are incapable of
waiving, and where this is so the parent may waive provided there is no conflict of
interest between the minor and his parent. Ibid.
lO6D.C. CODE ANN. §2-2202 (1961).
107 Black v. United States, No. 19038, D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 1965. At the time of
decision, no hearing was required before waiver.
108 N.J. RULES 6:9-1.
109 NJ. RULES 6:9-1(b).
110 N.J. RULES 6:9-1(a). State v. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565, 186 A.2d 284 (1962),
held that in cases involving homicides the court must grant a juvenile's request to be
represented during waiver proceedings. See State v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156, 188 A.2d
10, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 852 (1963).
111 McLaughlin & McGee, Juvenile Court Procedure, 17 ALA. L. REv. 226, 239
(1965).
112 Id. at 238.
113 11 re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 377 P.2d 74, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1962), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 838 (1963).
1
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and, if not, shall so advise them. In re Patterson construed these sections
for the first time. The minor appealed a judgment declaring him a ward
of the court and committing him to the youth authority for entering a
residence with intent to commit a theft. His appeal was based on the
failure of the juvenile court judge to advise him or his mother of the right
to counsel at the beginning of the fact-finding hearing under section 700.
The records before the juvenile court judge at the beginning of the hearing revealed the following facts: after the minor was taken into custody
he received a detention hearing, and an affidavit of a referee stated that
the minor was then advised of his right to counsel. The minor's mother
was not present at the detention hearing, but she was given written notice
of the hearing advising her of her right to have counsel appointed; she
never requested such appointment. The court affirmed the judgment,
holding that the juvenile court judge was "advised" that the minor and his
mother had been informed of their right to counsel from the records
before him, and that once the judge had ascertained from the records that
the minor and his parent had been informed of their rights, he was justified
in proceeding without again advising them. The duty would have devolved
on him only had the record not shown that they had previously been
informed. The court further rejected the minor's contention that section
700 required appointment in all cases where indigent juveniles were
charged with conduct which would constitute a felony if committed by an
adult. Appointment was held mandatory only after request. Chief Justice
Traynor, joined by two other justices, dissented, pointing out that the
majority's interpretation made section 700 practically superfluous. 114 The
juvenile court judge would now be permitted to ascertain whether the
minor or his parents had been informed of the right to counsel simply by
examining the record. No requirement was established that he must note
in the record that he ever made such an examination, nor did the majority
require him to determine the accuracy of the record or whether the absence
of counsel was the result of an intelligent waiver. It need not even be
determined that the mother read the notice sent her or that she was able
to read.
4. Evidentiary Problems
Perhaps the most vexing problems in the operation of juvenile court
hearings occur in the process of fact-finding. The concept of informal
procedures and the notion that the hearing is really a "search for the
truth" 'l have led to the idea that the strict rules of evidence ought not
11Id. at 853-57, 377 P.2d at 77-78, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 13-19.
115 This is not to say that regular criminal trials are not also searches for the
truth. However, ordinary criminal procedures place restraints on this search to
protect the defendant Thus, he may not be forced to answer a question which would
incriminate him, strict rules of evidence bar the hearing of certain types of statements,
confessions obtained under illegal circumstances are not admissible, and illegally
seized evidence is disallowed. These protections either do not exist in the juvenile
court or exist only in a modified form.
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to apply in juvenile courts. The effect such assertions have had on the
juvenile court fact-finding process will be a source of later discussion;
however, it must be remembered that claims of rehabilitative function or
non-criminality do not obviate the need to prove the fact that the juvenile
actually committed an offense listed in the jurisdictional section in order
to bring him under the processes of the juvenile court. Hopefully, the
offense will be proven in a legally reliable manner.
a. Burden of Proof
Even though juvenile court litigation may result in deprivation of
liberty, most courts and legislatures reaching the question have not required that the criminal law burden of proof be applied.116 New York,
for example, had seemed to be leaning toward the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt; 117 however, the 1962 Family Court Act resolved the question in favor of a "preponderance of the evidence" standard." s The requirement of only a preponderance of the evidence is usually
justified on the grounds that juvenile court adjudication is not criminal
litigation; being adjudged a delinquent does not carry, at least officially,
the stigma of criminal conviction; and imprisonment in a penal institution,
as a punishment, is not permitted under juvenile court law. 119 Thus the
added protection given to a criminal defendant by placing a strict burden
of proof on the state is not required in this context. These arguments
have been flatly rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia. In Jones v.
Commonwealth, 20 requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that court
stated:
The judgment against a youth that he is a delinquent is a
serious reflection upon his character and habits. The stain against
him is not removed merely because the statute says no judgment
in this particular proceeding shall be deemed a conviction for
crime or so considered. The stigma of conviction will reflect
upon him for life. It hurts his self-respect. It may, at some
inopportune, unfortunate moment, rear its ugly head to destroy
his opportunity for advancement, and blast his ambition to build
up a character and reputation entitling him to the esteem and re116 See, e.g., In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) ; State v. Ferrell,
209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); cf. Cantu v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948).
Apparently, some judges establish standards for their own court, such as requiring
"clear and convincing" proof, and some judges in jurisdictions requiring a lesser
burden of proof utilize the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt?' standard. Harvard
Research Project 795.
117 See It re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y. Supp. 765 (1931) ; In re Rich, 86
N.Y.S.2d 308 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949).
11s N.Y. FAmiLY CT. Acr § 744(b).
See In the Matter of Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d
194, 197, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848 (Family Ct 1963).
"19 See In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) ; State ex rel. Berry v.
Superior Court, 139 Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409 (.1926).
12 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
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spect of his fellow man. . . Guilt should be proven by evidence
way when
which leaves no reasonable doubt. Inference must give
12 1
in conflict with facts established by positive proof.
However, the recent revisions in New York and California, 22 both
adopting the lesser burden, seem to indicate that legislatures are not yet
willing to accept the argument that juvenile courts are, in substance if
not in form, acting as criminal tribunals in delinquency litigation. This
is unfortunate in that one of the most basic protections afforded those
who are in jeopardy of being deprived of their liberty following alleged
commission of criminal acts is that the proof of the act must be beyond
a reasonable doubt. Additionally, a stricter burden of proof would not
interfere with informal procedures if it is decided that such procedures
are to be retained.
b. Use of Hearsay
In the actual proof of facts, three basic problems run through almost
all juvenile court litigation: the extent to which hearsay evidence should
be utilized, the status of the protection against self-incrimination and the
rules governing use of confessions, which have already been touched upon.1a
Many of the evidentiary problems have been aggravated by a failure to
analyze properly the role of juvenile court hearings. These hearings serve
two separate and distinct functions: the court must first decide whether
the minor actually committed the act for which he is charged, and then
it must hear evidence to determine the proper form of treatment or disposition required. These will be referred to subsequently as the "fact-finding
function" and the "dispositive function." Because most courts and legislatures fail to differentiate the two, one hearing usually serves to satisfy
both. The result is that many facts relevant to the dispositive function,
such as hearsay reports of social workers and psychiatrists and material
concerning the juvenile's past history, which may very well prejudice the
minor's defense against the factual claim that he committed a crime, are
before the judge at the time he must make a decision whether it has been
proved that the juvenile is actually guilty of the acts charged.
121Id. at 341-42, 38 S.E.2d at 447. In a New Jersey case, In re Levis, 11 N.J.
217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953), concerning an adjudication for automobile homicide, the
state conceded that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required to sustain a judgment of delinquency. The court did not comment on this concession, except to cite
State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409 (1926), which held
only a preponderance of evidence is required. In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 221, 94 A.2d
328, 330 (1953).
= CAL. WELFARE & ITST'NS CODE: § 701; see In re Corey, 230 Cal. App. 2d 813,
823, 41 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1964). The constitutionality of the preponderance standard has been attacked on the ground that it is a violation of due process to commit
a minor on less evidence than is required to convict an adult. The asserted noncriminal nature of juvenile court proceedings formed the basis for rejecting this
argument. In re Johnson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 37, 38 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1964).
123

See pp. 1182-84 supra.
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The status of hearsay evidence in the juvenile court is presently in
doubt. On the one hand statements claiming that the rules of evidence
are relaxed in the court are common, 2 4 and apparently juvenile court
judges actually permit large amounts of hearsay evidence to be presented
at the hearing.125 However, when an appellate court is faced with a case
where hearsay has been admitted, the issue is rarely settled on the ground
that technical rules of evidence do not apply. Rather, many courts carefully examine the record to determine whether the juvenile court's findings
or judgment are supportable without the hearsay. 126 The problem is
27
further complicated by the statutes which prescribe informal procedures,
as it is difficult to determine the extent to which they authorize relaxed
rules of evidence.
Prior to a discussion of the case law there are several important observations to be made. The most basic is the attitude of the juvenile court
judges toward the use of hearsay. It is possible that they believe that
hearsay may be heard but that it is not, standing alone, a permissible basis
for a factual finding. However, it is equally possible that these judges
place hearsay on the same footing as direct evidence. It is not unlikely
that a judge himself may be confused by permissive statutes and the general philosophy of the juvenile court, which does not acknowledge that
juvenile hearings serve the same function as criminal trials. 128 Thus the
situation is distinguishable from a criminal trial heard by a judge without
jury, where it is commonly said that the admission of hearsay is usually
not grounds for reversal if other substantial evidence is present supporting
the judgment, because in that situation an ordinary judge is aware of the
rule against admission of hearsay and the right to cross examination. The
regular criminal process, therefore, is willing to tolerate admission of some
hearsay where a judge hears the case alone, because it is felt that he is
attuned to the dangers of this type of evidence and the general proscription
124 See, e.g., Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 156-57, 103 A.2d 460, 463 (1954);
McLaughlin & McGee, supra note 111, at 229.
125 See, e.g., Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems
of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 16-17; HarvardResearch Project 794-95:
The informality of juvenile court hearings frequently leads to the admission of hearsay and unsworn testimony. It is said that "close adherence to
the strict rules of evidence might prevent the court from obtaining important
facts as to the child's character and condition which could only be to the child's
detriment." The assumption is that the judge will give normally inadmissible
evidence only its proper weight. It is also declared in support of these evidentiary practices that the juvenile court is not a criminal court, that the
importance of the hearsay rule has been overestimated, and that allowing an
attorney to make "technical objections" would disrupt the desired informality
of the proceedings.
126 See, e.g, In re Bently, 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944).
Some courts seem to say that the hearsay rule applies with full force in the
juvenile court. See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933) ; People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584,
587 (1927) (dictum).
127 See pp. 1176, 1185 supra.
2 8
1
See note 125 supra.
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against its use, enabling him intellectually to disregard the hearsay when
making a finding of fact. This may not be assumed in the juvenile court
where the judge might be confused as to the permissible role of hearsay
and could feel justified in giving hearsay the same status as direct evidence.
Therefore, in the absence of a clear rule that hearsay evidence is not
permitted in the juvenile court, it is no answer to say that its admission
is no more dangerous than its admission in a criminal case heard without
a jury. Further, the fact that criminal cases may be heard by a jury
lessens the danger of hearsay. This protection is not available in juvenile
courts. 120

It seems clear, if it is deemed that the use of hearsay is harmful

and should be greatly restricted, that current juvenile court procedures,
in light of present uncertainty, are not sufficient to afford proper protection.
The clearest statement concerning the current state of the law of
evidence in the juvenile courts is that most appellate courts will not uphold
a judgment based solely on hearsay. 130 Illustrating this principle is the
case of In re Sippy, 131 which concerned a judgment finding the minor to
be habitually beyond the control of her parent and an order committing
her to a school for an indefinite period. The only evidence presented
consisted of two hearsay reports, the first made by an attorney reporting
a conversation with the minor's physician, and the second a social worker's
report containing statements made by the same physician, to the effect
that the minor should "enroll" in a welfare school. The reversing court
placed its decision on the grounds that the minor had been deprived of
the right to cross examination and that it was error to base a finding
82
totally on unsworn testimony.
notes 77 & 78 supra and accompanying text.
1 Can it be that the legislature . . . intended to destroy the traditional and
constitutional safeguards of a trial? Can it be intended that trials should be
had without the benefit of testimony of witnesses given under the sanction of
oath or affirmation? Can it be said that the legislature intended that the
liberty of a child had less sanctity than that of an adult? Even if it did so
129 See
30

intend, could that intention be sustained? We think not.
it re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 907, 62 N.W.2d 308, 311 (1954) ; see In re Hill, 78 Cal.
App. 23, 247 Pac. 591 (1926); cf. In re Davis, 83 A.2d 590, 594 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
App. 1951).
-13197 A.2d 455 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953).
132 See also In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952), a notorious
case which represents the nadir of reported juvenile court litigation. More than a
total absence of direct evidence was involved in Green. A probation officer requested

Green's father to appear with Green at the office of the probation department; neither
father nor son was informed of the reasons behind the request. When they arrived
they were taken into the chambers of the juvenile court judge, who requested that
the minor leave the room. Without informing him why he was there or that charges
had been filed against the juvenile, the judge told elder Green that he was going to send
his son to the boy's school and "straighten him up." Green was granted no hearing,
no witnesses were produced and no attorney or prosecutor was present. The judge
based his determination wholly on hearsay testimony contained in a probation officer's
report The reversing court said:
The petition reveals a star chamber proceeding whereby a boy was torn from
the custody of his parents and deprived of his liberty without a semblance
of due process and by reason of a judgment that was not merely erroneous
but absolutely void. We realize the Juvenile Court Act of 1945 permits
courts to conduct hearings for the purpose of determining juvenile delinquency
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However, some courts have violated even this rather extreme line.
Holmes' Appeal,133 for example, was a case in which a juvenile was
deprived of his liberty even though no direct evidence was introduced.
Holmes was adjudged a delinquent because he drove an auto without a
license and was placed on probation. Five days later another petition
was filed before the court charging the minor with participation in the
armed robbery of a church. At the hearing apparently the only evidence
supporting the latter charge was the testimony of a detective that one of
the two men convicted of the same crime in criminal court had implicated
the minor in his confession. The confession had been subsequently repudiated, including the statements implicating Holmes. In spite of this the
minor was committed to the Pennsylvania Industrial School. In affirming
the commitment, the state supreme court said "the fact that the testimony
of the detective was technically 'hearsay' was . . . wholly unimportant,"
and the repudiation of the original confession was considered of little note
because "the judge was not obliged to believe . . . [the] retraction." 134
A similar result obtained in another Pennsylvania case, In re Mont.a 5
A detective read into evidence the juvenile's "apparently voluntary statement" of the facts concerning an alleged accidental shooting of which
Mont was accused. Mont was then required to take the stand and corroborate his prior confession with self-incriminatory testimony. Additionally, there seems to have been a hearsay investigatory report before
in an informal manner and, to the end that the interests of the juvenile and
of society generally shall be protected, the provisions of the act should be
liberally construed without undue regard for the technicalities of the law that
sometimes serve to protect those accused of crime. Nevertheless the act does
not, nor could it within constitutional limitations, sanction the action of a
court in finding a juvenile guilty of a wrong against the state in disregard of
his rights to a hearing in which he is apprised of the charges against him and
the evidence in support thereof and afforded an opportunity to defend himself.
Id. at 86-87, 108 N.E.2d at 649-50.
133 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied sub nora. In re Holmes, 348
U.S. 973 (1955).
134 Id. at 606, 109 A.2d at 526.
It may be argued that Holmes should be considered a violation of probation case, and that the same standards for initially proving
a criminal offense should not apply to a hearing where the issue before the court is
merely a question of parole violation. As to the Hohnes case there are two answers
to this contention. The opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gives no indication that the case was viewed as a parole violation hearing; rather the court made
broad statements concerning the applicability of evidentiary rules in the juvenile court.
Further, the lower court in Holmes specifically held that even if the case is considered as a separate adjudication rather than a revocation of parole, none of the
minor's rights were violated because the action was non-criminal. In re Holmes, 175
Pa. Super. 137, 143-44, 103 A.2d 454, 457 (1954).
Beyond these arguments, it is contended that in no case should a juvenile court
be permitted to revoke parole without hearing adequate, legally reliable proof of the
acts forming the basis for the parole revocation. Holmes provides an illustration why
such a rule should be followed in the juvenile court. The juvenile was adjudged a
delinquent for operating an auto without a license, a relatively minor offense, and
placed on probation. The second offense, of which there was no direct proof, was
the much more serious crime of armed robbery. While technically the court may
have incarcerated Holmes for violation of his parole, it seems obvious that the court
was willing to deprive him of his liberty only for the second offense. Yet under
normal legal standards, no second offense was ever proved.
135 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).
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the court. The judgment finding Mont to be a delinquent and committing
him to reform school was affirmed on the alternative grounds that the
hearsay was not necessary to support the judgment and that hearsay rules
are not applicable generally to juvenile court proceedings. The latter
alternative was based on the lower court opinion in Holmes, which confusingly states that the admission of hearsay is not reversible error if the
record is "legally and factually adequate to sustain the findings and order
of commitment." 136 This statement seems to imply that a judgment may
not be supported by hearsay alone, yet in Mont the major portion of the
evidence adduced seems to have been just that, corroborated by selfincriminatory statements of the juvenile.
Beyond the relatively clear line of total absence of direct evidence,
the entire area becomes murky. Most courts, unlike the Holmes court, are
not willing to hold the hearsay rule inapplicable to juvenile court proceedings. However, sometimes hearsay has been introduced and the judgment
affirmed without discussion of the applicability of hearsay rules. In re
Garcia,137 a California case, is an illustration. The court rejected a claim
of prejudice in the admission of a hearsay probation officer's report. This
contention was disposed of quickly; the court held that there was not
only a right to consider the report, but a duty to do so. It is possible to
read a case like Garcia narrowly to hold that a probation report, which
is probably required reading in the dispositive portion of the hearing, may
be introduced in evidence before the judge sentences the minor. Thus
the case may not stand for the proposition that hearsay evidence is generally
admissible in juvenile courts, but that one type of hearsay report is permitted for sentencing purposes. In this light, the case is merely an example
of the problems encountered because the fact-finding and dispositive functions are both satisfied in one hearing. Regardless of the way the case is
considered, the fact remains that the judge is permitted to consider this
type of evidence to the asserted prejudice of the minor prior to the time
factual disputes are resolved.
It is much more frequent, however, to find courts acknowledging that
the hearsay rule applies to some extent in the juvenile court and then
struggling with the application. Some courts consider whether there was
"sufficient" evidence aside from the hearsay to support the judgment. 38
9
Thus Harry v. State 13
sustained a finding of delinquency and a commitment even though the probation officer testified that the minor had threatened some boys with a knife "if they told certain things," because "there is
ample proof to sustain the judgment of the court without the evidence
36

1

11;

re Eolmes, 175 Pa. Super. 137, 146, 103 A.2d 454, 459 (1954).

Cal. App. 2d 662, 20 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1962).
See, e.g., In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), where the
court said that if there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment without the
hearsay, unless the contrary is shown, it will be presumed that the court disregarded
the hearsay in rendering judgment.
'39246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944).
'137201
138
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,, 140 The unfortunate flaw in this type of reasoning
is the danger that the juvenile court judge might have actually considered
the hearsay in coming to a decision. In some cases the lack of findings
of fact or opinion make it virtually impossible to determine what the
juvenile court considered relevant, and the appellate court must assume
that the hearsay was ignored, 141 an assumption they seem willing to
make in spite of the danger that the confused state of the law might
mislead a juvenile court judge into believing that the use of hearsay in
making factual findings is permitted. Another approach taken by some
courts is to decide whether the hearsay admitted was prejudicial. 142 This
is preferable in that it does not force the courts to play the guessing game
of whether the hearsay was considered. If it was admitted, and contained
the danger of prejudice, grounds for reversal are present.
Hearsay evidence is generally not admissible in criminal trials for
two reasons: it is thought to be basically unreliable and its use denies the
defendant the right of cross examination. Unless a distinction can be
found between a criminal trial and the fact-finding function of the juvenile
court hearing-and none is apparent-the same reasons for rejecting
hearsay testimony apply equally in the juvenile court when questions of
fact are at issue. It is in the area of the dispositive function that hearsay
evidence may properly play an important role. Reports which compile
material gathered over a period of years concerning the minor's social,
environmental and psychological problems are undoubtedly helpful to a
judge deciding the proper form of disposition. Without this type of
report the expense and time required to reconstruct all of the studies and
examinations concerning the minor might well be prohibitive. Of course,
in the best of all possible worlds it would be preferable to have before the
court every psychologist, social worker, probation officer and police official
who contributed to the social records of the minor, but if this is impossible,
the use of social records and the testimony of probation officers and social
workers currently working with the juvenile is a fair compromise. 43 The
problem should be resolved by the establishment of procedures which
permit the fact-finding function to be satisfied at a hearing where the strict
rules of evidence are observed and where only evidence relevant to the
question of whether the minor committed the act for which he is charged
is permitted, while providing for the satisfaction of the dispositive function in a more informal atmosphere where the rules of evidence are
appropriately relaxed.

in question ....

40

1

Id. at 81, 16 N.W.2d at 395.

141 See In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
142 See Campbell v. Siegler, 10 N.J. Misc. 987, 162 Atl. 154 (1932); State v.
Christensen, 179 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951), for examples of cases taking this
approach and affirming judgments of delinquency where hearsay had been admitted.
In Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), the court reversed
the juvenile court on similar grounds.
143 Judges are permitted to use this type of hearsay report for sentencing purposes
in regular criminal courts. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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California and New York'" have attempted to solve these problems
by dividing the hearing into two parts. 145 Under the California code,
after hearing evidence concerning the commission of the act, the court
must make its factual findings, and if it is found that the minor committed
the act, evidence may be heard on the issue of disposition. 146 Apparently,
the dispositional hearing may follow immediately after the fact-finding portion, or the court may continue proceedings after initial findings are
made. 147 To support a factual determination that the minor has committed a criminal act, a preponderance of the evidence legally admissible
in criminal trials must be adduced. In other juvenile court cases a judgment against the defendant must be supported by a preponderance of the
48
evidence legally admissible in civil cases.'
However, statutes like the California code, as enacted, leave major
problems unsolved. While the division of the hearing could prove effective
in removing from the factual hearing hearsay evidence necessary for a
dispositional determination, the statute seems to permit the introduction
of hearsay during the fact-finding hearing, 149 and it certainly does not
expressly prohibit it. If this is so, the same confusion concerning the
use of second-hand evidence remains, with the possibility of some judges
believing that it is to be given the same weight as direct evidence. Only
the portion of the statute requiring a preponderance of evidence legally
admissible in criminal trials to support a judgment points to an opposite
conclusion, but this section may be read as codifying cases holding that
the admission of hearsay is not grounds for reversal if sufficient other
evidence is present.
(a) Only evidence that is competent, material and relevant may be admitted in an adjudicatory hearing.
(b) Any determination of an adjudicatory hearing that a respondent did
an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. For this
purpose, an uncorroborated confession made out of court by a respondent is
not sufficient.
N.Y. FAmIY CT. ACT § 744.
(a) Only evidence that is material and relevant may be admitted during
a dispositional hearing.
(b) An adjudication at the conclusion of a dispositional hearing must be
based on a preponderance of the evidence.
N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 745.
145 CAL. WELFARE & INSTNS CODE §§ 701-02.
14
6 CAL. WELFA E & INsT'Ns CODE § 702.
.47 Ibid. After it is found that the minor has committed the offense charged, the
court may continue the hearing for a period not to exceed ten days. This would seem
to permit the trial judge to set aside time for himself or the lawyers to prepare for
the dispositive hearing.
148 CAL. WEIFRE & INsT'Ns CoDE § 701.
149 At the hearing, the court shall first consider only the question whether
the minor is a person described by Sections 600, 601, or 602, and for this
purpose, any matter or information relevant and material to the circumstances
or acts which are alleged to bring him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court is admissible and may be received in evidence . ...
CAL. WEFRE & INS 'N CODE § 701.
144

1202

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.114:1171

Another unanswered question under the California code is whether
the finder of fact may read the social reports prior to the resolution of
the factual dispute. The statute suggests that he may, because there is
no requirement of a continuance between the first and second part of
the hearing. 150 Apart from the statute, In re Patterson'5' may have
settled the question in favor of allowing the trier of fact to read the reports
before factual findings are made. In that case the minor complained that
the judgment was not supported by sufficient evidence, and that the
probation officer's report containing hearsay had been improperly admitted. The California Supreme Court rejected the hearsay contention,
citing a case decided before the bifurcated hearing was instituted which
permitted a probation officer's report to be admitted in evidence. 5 2 It is
not clear, however, at what point during the hearing in Pattersonthe report was introduced. If courts permit that type of hearsay to be admitted
prior to the settlement of factual issues, much of the benefit of the bifurcated hearing is lost.
The problems encountered under an ambiguous law demonstrate that
if hearsay is to be prohibited during the fact-finding hearing, the direction
must be explicit. Even where the judge alone hears the case explicitness
is necessary to clear up the confusion now present and to guarantee that
hearsay erroneously or inadvertently admitted will not be considered
when factual determinations are made. Of course, if juries come into
wide use, the usual strict rules of evidence must be applied.
However, there are some who contend that the strict rules of evidence
have no place in the juvenile courts and others who maintain that some
rules are overly legalistic, concluding that only those which have been
shown by human experience to protect the court against unreliable statements and distortions of fact should be retained in the juvenile court.15 3
The easy answer is that since juvenile courts hear criminal cases and
deprive people of their liberty, they should offer the accused the same
protection as do other courts performing the same function. However,
one need not rest on this argument alone. It may very well be that the
law of evidence is outmoded in some respects and reform by way of uniform
codes would be a good thing. But the reform should reach the whole
system. There should be little to distinguish the fact-finding function of
the criminal and juvenile courts, and effective reform could reach both
institutions simultaneously; but until this is done, it is doubtful that
juvenile court judges and appellate judges should make piecemeal deci150 Section 702 merely grants the court discretion to continue the hearing.
15158 Cal. 2d 848, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10, 337 P.2d 74 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S.

838 (1963).
152 Id. at 853, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 13, 377 P.2d at 77, citing In re Halamuda, 85
Cal. App. 2d 219, 192 P2d 781 (1948) (probation officer's report held admissible at
hearing where child was removed from parents' custody). But see CAL. WEARE
& INST'Ns CODE § 706.
153 See Harvard Research Project 794-95.
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sions concerning which rules of evidence should be retained. This would
seem to be a task requiring comprehensive legislative revision.
c. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The second major evidentiary problem in juvenile courts is the use
of self-incriminatory statements. Judging by the number of reported
cases, it is not an issue often raised on appeal. This is not to say that
it is unimportant since many juveniles, without the aid of counsel, admit
at their hearings the charges brought against them, and most courts reaching the question have been willing to uphold judgments in cases where
the minor has been forced to incriminate himself at the hearing.
The leading case holding that there is no constitutional right to protection against self-incrimination in the juvenile court is In re Santillanes,'54 a 1943 New Mexico decision. The juvenile challenged the constitutionality of the act establishing juvenile courts on several grounds,
including the failure to protect against self-incrimination. The state
supreme court upheld the statute, simply accepting the dogma that juvenile
court litigation is non-criminal. Some cases have held that not only is
there no duty to warn the juvenile against incriminating himself but that
the court may require him to answer incriminating questions even though
he objects. 55
In re Tahbel,1 61 decided by a California appellate court in 1920, is
probably the earliest case granting juveniles protection against self-incrimination. After the minor was charged in a petition before the juvenile
court with several crimes, including perjury, the petition was referred to
a referee to hear testimony and report to the court. The minor, in the
course of the referee's investigation, refused on advice of counsel to answer
a question. At the hearing before the juvenile court on the referee's report,
the judge instructed the minor to answer the question, and when he refused
he was ordered committed to a juvenile institution until he complied. The
appellate court granted a petition of habeas corpus, stating:
It would have been strange indeed if the legislature had sought
to visit a minor with the loss of his natural parents' society,
guidance, and government merely because, forsooth, he had the
temerity to invoke the protection of a constitutional guarantee
incorporated into the state's organic law for the very purpose of
safeguarding his personal liberty against the methods that ob157
tained when confessions were extorted by inquisitorial abuses.
154 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943) ; see People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183
N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933).
155 See Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 604, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954), cert. dedied
sub nrom. Its re Holmes, 348 U.S. 973 (1955); Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150,
103 A.2d 460 (1954).
156 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920).
157 Id. at 761, 189 Pac. at 807.

1204

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.114:1171

Of course, Tahbel may be narrowly read to hold only that a juvenile may
not be compelled under force of imprisonment to answer a self-incriminatory question. Subsequently, California appears to have adopted the
position that there is no right against self-incrimination in the juvenile
court. Twenty-seven years after Tahbel, in the case of In re Dargo,158
where a fourteen year old boy was committed to the Youth Authority
for being implicated in a robbery netting eleven dollars, the court rejected
a claim of self-incrimination because the minor was not being tried for
a crime. The status of the protection against self-incrimination is unclear
under the new California code as there seems to be no provision specifically
granting that right.
The development in Texas is instructive. in 1944 the Texas Supreme
Court held as a matter of statutory construction that a juvenile could
not be forced to testify. 159 In 1949 the state court of civil appeals acknowledged the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself in the juvenile
court but held that the court was not required to inform the juvenile of
his right. 31 0 Because of the small number of juveniles represented by
counsel before the court, 161 the latter opinion virtually rendered the prior
one nugatory. The most advanced state examined is New York, whose
new statute contains a provision requiring that the juvenile be advised
162
of his "right to remain silent" at the commencement of the hearing.
As seen from the foregoing, the claim that the privilege against selfincrimination is not constitutionally required in the juvenile court proceeds from the oft repeated assertion that juvenile courts are not criminal
courts and that they do not hear criminal cases. The fact still remains
that children stand accused of criminal acts before the court, and, if found
to have committed those acts, they stand in jeopardy of being deprived
of their liberty. Even if we do not proceed on the constitutional level,
but consider the question of what the juvenile courts should do rather
than what they are required to do, minors should not be required to
incriminate themselves. The usual rationale for the privilege is that ours
is an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system and that by not
requiring a person to testify against himself the worst aspect of the inquisitorial system-placing the accused on the witness stand and dragging
a confession out of him-is eliminated. The juvenile court is one area
where this may be a real danger since the accused are always young and
in many instances inexperienced.'6
It is absurd to protect adults from
this danger but to let juveniles take their chances. Furthermore, it is
possible that a confession drawn from a juvenile while being intimidated
158 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947).

159 Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 450, 179 S.W.2d 269 1944).
16o Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
161 See note 83 supra and accompanying text
162 N.Y. F my
CT.Acr § 741.
163 See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
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on the witness stand will be untrue. It seems clear that informing the
juvenile of his privilege is necessary to make it effective.
d. Transcripts of the Evidence
Related to the policing of evidence admitted in juvenile court hearings is the ability of the minor to procure a transcript of the hearings. It
is common to find appellate courts indulging, without a transcript, in presumptions or assumptions concerning the conduct of the hearing and the
basis for the lower court's judgment. 16 4 Obviously dismayed by this
state of affairs, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the failure of
the juvenile court to require a stenographic record was violative of due
process.' 65 Under the California code, an official reporter must take the
record at any hearing conducted by a judge of the juvenile court, and
if the judge or the parties so request, must transcribe it.6 6 The costs
of transcribing the record are borne by the person requesting the transcription unless the court in its discretion otherwise directs.107 Not all states,
however, go this far. Under the rules of the New Jersey courts, stenographers are required only in cases where the juvenile is charged with
homicide.' 6 8 In all other cases, if the minor desires a record, he must
hire a reporter and at the request of the court is required to file a copy
of the transcript at his own expense. 169
A statute that requires less than a reporter at all juvenile court hearings at the cost of the state, together with a provision for the costs of
transcription in cases involving indigents, is inadequate in the context of
the juvenile court system. Without a record the appeal process is reduced
to a guessing game.
164 See It re Garcia, 201 Cal. App. 2d 662, 20 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1962) ; State v.
Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 515-16, 161 A.2d 520, 527-28 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 939
(1961). A California court has refused to indulge in such presumptions. In re
Alexander,
152 Cal. App. 2d 458, 313 P2d 182 (1957).
65

In civil proceedings affecting property rights of a child, every right is
safeguarded lest the child become the victim of oppression and skullduggery.
Records of such proceedings are meticulously preserved. Should we observe
any less concern of a child's life and liberty than we do for his property?
Should he be subject to what a record of the hearing might disclose was in
the nature of a Star Chamber proceeding? The answer obviously should be,
no. Yet in cases of this kind, the failure of the statute to spell out the proceedings permits less caution than it provides in civil cases on the matter of
recording the proceedings. In Juvenile Courts the proceedings may be conducted in such an informal manner with no transcript required to be made
that what was done becomes a matter of mere conjecture, surmise, and guess.
Without a record of the proceedings, upon what basis can a rational adjudication by review of the petitioner's rights be predicated? Not to require the
making of a formal record in such cases subjects the child to an exercise of
arbitrary will, whim, or caprice of the judge, with no record upon which to
attack it. We cannot reconcile such procedure with the orderly processes
associated with the law.
It re Smith, 326 P.2d 835, 839-40 (Oki. Crim. Ct. App. 1958).
166 CAL. WELARE & IsT'Ns CoDE § 677.
167 Ibid.
168 NJ. Rurr.s 6:9-1 (b).
169 N.J. Rurss 6:2-10.
1
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e. Waiver of Jurisdiction
In Kent v. United States,170 the United States Supreme Court faced
the problems raised by a procedure virtually unique to the juvenile court
system, the power of the juvenile court to relinquish its jurisdiction under
certain circumstances to permit the state to prosecute the minor in a regular
criminal court. This procedure, usually called relinquishment of jurisdiction or waiver of jurisdiction, will be referred to simply as waiver.
The purpose or purposes of permitting waiver are not clear. Various
justifications have been articulated, but apparently no jurisdiction has
carefully spelled out the underlying policy. The result has been a great
deal of confusion as to what tests should be applied by a court considering waiving jurisdiction. The waiver statutes add little to the understanding of the process, other than at what age a minor is vulnerable to
ordinary criminal prosecution. For example, the District of Columbia
Code permits the court "after full investigation" to waive jurisdiction of
juveniles aged sixteen and seventeen who are charged with offenses considered felonies under ordinary criminal law and of juveniles of any age
7
who are accused of crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.1 1
The full investigation standard is left unexplained, and the statute offers
no further guidance. The New Jersey statute permits waivers
if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the juvenile and domestic
relations court that a case of juvenile delinquency . . . com-

mitted by a juvenile of the age of 16 or 17 years, should not be
dealt with by the court, either because of the fact the person is
an habitual offender, or has been charged with an offense of a
heinous nature, under circumstances which may require the imposition of a sentence rather than the disposition permitted by . . .
[the juvenile Court Act] for the welfare of society ....
172
Under Alabama law jurisdiction of a child over the age of fourteen may
be waived if it is found that he "cannot be made to lead a correct life
and cannot be properly disciplined" under the provisions of the juvenile
court law.l73
170 86 Sup. Ct 1045 (1966).
171 D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. V, 1966).
172 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4-15 (1952); see NJ. RULEs 6:9-7. Under the New
Jersey statute a sixteen or seventeen year old juvenile can cause his own waiver by
demanding a trial by jury. When such a demand is made to the court, it must refer
the case to the prosecutor for normal criminal adjudication. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A :4-15
(1952).
17 A.A. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958). Alabama, which provides the juvenile court

with exclusive jurisdiction only over minors under sixteen, also provides for the
reverse of waiver. Instead of the juvenile court making the first determination
whether a sixteen or seventeen year old offender should be prosecuted criminally, the
criminal court is given initial jurisdiction over such offenders and is given the power
to transfer them to a juvenile court if it deems "it to be in the interest of justice and
of the public welfare .

.

.

."

ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 363 (1958) ; see Davis v. State,

259 Ala. 212, 66 So. 2d 714 (1953). Of course, fourteen and fifteen year old minors
may be transferred from the juvenile court.
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California law on this subject is particularly confusing; one section
of the state code permits waiver if the court finds that the minor "is
not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with" in the juvenile courts,
mentioning no age limits or other special requirements' 7 4 while a second
section states:
At any time during a hearing upon a petition alleging that a
minor is, by reason of violation of any criminal statute or ordinance, a person described in Section 602, when substantial evidence has been adduced to support a finding that the offense alleged is punishable as a felony under the general law and that
the minor was 16 years of age or older at the time of the alleged
commission of such offense, or that the offense alleged is punishable as a misdemeanor under the general law and that the minor
was 18 years of age or older at the time of the alleged commission of such offense, and that the minor would not be amenable to
the care, treatment and training program available through the
facilities of the juvenile court, . . . the court may make a finding
.. . that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under this chapter, and the court shall direct the district attorney
.
to prosecute the person under the applicable criminal
statute ....175
Why and how these two sections coexist in the same statute is unexplained; it has, however, been held that the latter is not the exclusive
vehicle for waiver. Thus, in Knight v. Superior Court' 76 the juvenile
court was permitted to waive jurisdiction of a child under sixteen utilizing
17 7
the predecessor of the first section.
A questionnaire circulated among fifty juvenile courts revealed that
five factors commonly are taken into account in a decision to waive
jurisdiction: (1) issues of contestable fact indicate that the hearing in
the juvenile court will be prolonged; (2) the offense, occurring after corS CODE § 606.
When a petition has been filed in a juvenile court, the minor who is the subject of the petition shall not thereafter be subject to criminal prosecution
based on the facts giving rise to the petition unless the juvenile court finds that
the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under this chapter
and orders that criminal proceedings be resumed or instituted against him.
175 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 707.
176102 Cal. App. 2d 211, 227 P2d 62 (1951).
1-77 One court has interpreted the provisions corresponding to §§ 606 and 707 under
prior law. It was held that in cases where the minor was brought before the juvenile
court initially by certification from a criminal court, rather than by petition filed in
the juvenile court, the special requirements of the prior § 707 need not be satisfied.
People v. Yeager, 55 Cal. 2d 374, 359 P.2d 261, 10 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1961). This is
an unsatisfactory explanation, for no other section of the code distinguishes cases
on the basis of origin, and the sections give no indication that such a distinction should
be made. It is strange that the drafters did not clarify this ambiguity when the new
code was enacted.
174 CAL. WELFARE & INST'
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rectional treatment for a previous transgression, is serious; (3) the
juvenile's case is "hopeless"; (4) the juvenile needs to be punished for
his attitude; (5) the advantages in resources for treatment and public
safety lie with the criminal court rather than the juvenile court. 17 The
juvenile court of the District of Columbia, apparently in an attempt to
beef up a meager statute, published a policy memorandum listing the considerations germane to the issue of waiver. Included in the list were:
the seriousness of the alleged offense and the need for community protection; whether the offense was committed in a violent or aggressive
manner; the prosecutive merit of the complaint judged by the strength
of the evidence after consultation with the United States attorney; and
the sophistication of the juvenile, his past record and the chances for
rehabilitation. 179 The memorandum containing these standards has been
withdrawn, apparently in response to a barrage of criticism, and currently the District of Columbia court is operating under the unaugmented
"full investigation" standard. 8 0° However, except for these two sources,
information concerning factors motivating judges to relinquish jurisdiction is scarce.
Statistically, it does not appear that the number of waivers is large;181
it must be kept in mind, however, that no thoroughgoing study has been
made, and the available statistics are rather sketchy. It also appears that
some courts are freer in their attitude toward waiver than others ;18 consequently, while absolute figures may not be large, in some jurisdictions
relinquishment of jurisdiction is a problem of substantial proportions. Of
even greater importance is the fact that almost all waiver cases involve
178 Advisory Council of judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Court: A Policy Statement, 8
CRIME & D LIZ QuENcy 3, 5 (1962).
These responses are criticized. Id. at 5-7.
1-79 Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct 1045, 1060 (1966).
In Green v. United
States, 308 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court, citing the policy memorandum, said:
"The Juvenile Court's waiver of jurisdiction, whatever else it is, is also a judicial
finding of probable cause to believe the accused guilty." Id. at 304.
180 United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545, 550-51 (D.D.C. 1965). In the
Caviness case, where the propriety of the waiver was in issue, the Executive Director
of the Social Service testified as to standards applied in a decision to waive, and when
he was questioned about standards after the policy memorandum was withdrawn, his
response was that the judge of the juvenile court "may or may not have considered
'the basic things that were in the published criteria.'" Id. at 550.
United States v. Madsen, 148 F. Supp. 625 (D. Alaska 1957), provides an example
of how even the minimal standard of full investigation can be emasculated. The
court held that an investigation of the circumstances of the homicide conducted by
the U.S. Commissioner, who also acted as coroner and as justice of the peace, satisfied the full investgation requirement of the statute, even though no social investigation
of the minor was conducted prior to waiver.
181 See Advisory Council of Judges, stpra note 178, at 10; Statistical Comparison
of Children's Courts Serving the Nation's Twelve Largest Cities, 13 JuvENmx
CT.
JuDGEs J. 14, 14-15 (1962).
182 It is reported in Harrison v. United States, No. 17991, D.C. Cir., Dec. 7,
1965, that in 1962, 235 out of 2600 cases referred to the juvenile court resulted in
waivers. However, it is noted that the total number of referrals may be overstated.
See Advisory Council of judges, supra
note 178, at 10.
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minors who have committed serious offenses or who have been before the
juvenile court previously.' 8 3 This is the group probably most in need of
rehabilitative treatment and most likely to have anti-social tendencies
which would be reinforced by contact with adult criminal offenders, a possible result of criminal conviction.
Because the decision to waive is extremely important, potentially
affecting the entire future of a juvenile, one might expect that procedures
would be established carefully to safeguard his interests. This is not
always the case. The District of Columbia code, for example, requires
no procedural protections, and only by virtue of a series of court decisions
are minimum protections attached to the waiver procedure. 8 4 During
the period when not even a hearing was required the D.C. Circuit
had ruled that a minor was entitled to counsel while the court was deliberating the question of waiver, 8 5 and not until the current term did
the Supreme Court in Kent decide that a hearing was required or that
the juvenile court need file an opinion stating the reasons for relinquishing
jurisdiction. 88 Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling it was virtually
impossible to ascertain the basis for waiver. However, the Supreme Court
did not solve the problem raised by the lack of standards in the waiver
statute and left untouched the narrow scope of review enunciated by the
court of appeals, which allows reversal of waiver only when the juvenile
court acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 87 It would seem virtually impossible to reverse under such standards if the juvenile court followed proper
procedure, because without a standard to judge by, how may it ever be
said that a court acted arbitrarily? ' 8 8 An illustration is the court of
appeals' opinion in Kent, where it was held that the waiver was not
183 See Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (robbery by
force and violence); United States v. Stevenson, 170 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1959)
(assault of a police officer) ; Duck v. State, 176 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1965)
murder) ; In re Brekke, 233 Cal. App. 2d 196, 43 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1965) (murder
-repeated offender) ; People v. Machado, 150 Cal. App. 2d 190, 309 P.2d 903 (1957)
(felony-murder) ; People v. Renteria, 60 Cal. App. 2d 463, 141 P.2d 37 (1943) (automobile theft-repeated offender) ; State v. Loray, 46 N.J. 179, 215 A.2d 539 (1965)
(murder) ; State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
939 (1961) (felony-murder).
184 Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966) (hearing required before
waiver; juvenile court must state reasons for waiver) ; Black v. United States, 355
F2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (right to counsel during waiver deliberations granted);
Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (minor's attorney may
inspect social records).
185 Black v. United States, supra note 184.
186 Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct 1045 (1966).
187 Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kent, it had been held that a waiver
certificate stating that a full investigation was made is presumed valid. United States v.
Green, 200 F. Supp. 687, 688 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 308 F.2d 303 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); see Wilhite v. United States, 281 F.2d 642, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The
present status of this presumption is unclear.
188 In Briggs v. United States, 226 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1955), an attack on the
constitutionality of the waiver statute (asserted voidness for lack of standards) was
rejected.
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arbitrary because "the essence of the juvenile court system is subjective
judgment-the skill and experience of the specialist judge brought to bear
upon young people in trouble." 189 Beyond this, after years of experience
under the D.C. code it is still unclear whether an appellate court has
the power to remand a case back to the juvenile court even if it finds the
waiver to have been arbitrary and capricious. 190 If there is no power,
the adult court has only one alternative if it feels that the juvenile would
best be dealt with under juvenile court law; the D.C. code provides a
safety valve procedure whereby the district court may convene itself as
a juvenile court.191 Not only is this procedure rarely used, 19 2 but it
forces the district court to act as a specialized tribunal in an area where
it has no special expertise when an expert court is available. A far
more rational solution would be to permit remand to the juvenile court
after waiver.
In other jurisdictions the procedures leading to waiver vary. Alabama, a state which is fairly backward in providing juveniles procedural
protections, 19 3 seems to afford a hearing before waiver, and evidence concerning the minor's guilt is not sufficient to sustain a waiver order.194
However, no right to counsel is provided. 195 A series of recent decisions
189 Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
190 See United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545, 546 (D.D.C. 1965), interpreting Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
191 D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. V, 1966). This procedure was utilized in
United States v. Anonymous, 176 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1959). See United States
v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545, 552 (D.D.C. 1965).
192 A colloquy by defense counsel and a district court judge reported in Franklin
v. United States, 330 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1964), concerning the question of whether
the district court should convene itself as a juvenile court, may indicate attitudes of
judges to this procedure:
Mr. Harrison [defense counsel]: Under the Pee case, Your Honor,
this court in its discretion has the right to try Price as a juvenile if you so
desire. At this time I request that you do so.
The Court: I decline the request because that is a power that I have not
exercised because I think it is perfectly foolish for the Juvenile Court to
waive jurisdiction on the theory that a person should be tried in the District
Court and then the District Court gives juvenile procedures. No, I am not
going to reverse or set aside the discretion of the Juvenile Judge, which, in
effect, I would be doing. In any event, entirely aside from that, when a
person is charged with robbery and rape he should be tried as an adult.
Id. at 209-10 n.4. In reversing, the court of appeals said:
In making this determination, the court must consider the individual case
before it and not refuse to exercise its discretion because of a preconceived
notion that the statute which gives it the right so to do is "foolish" or that
the statutory discretion should never be exercised affirmatively "when a person
is charged with robbery and rape."
Id. at 210.
193 See generally McLaughlin & McGee, Juvenile Court Procedure, 17 ALA. L.

REv. 226 (1965).
194 See Duck v. State, 176 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1965) ; Stapler v. State, 273
Ala. 358, 141 So. 2t 181 (1962) (Evidence tending to show that the juvenile committed
the offense may not, standing alone, support a waiver order).
105 See McLaughlin & McGee, supra note 193, at 228.
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in New Jersey have held that a hearing is required before waiver, 196 and
in cases involving homicides counsel must be appointed to represent the
juvenile at a waiver hearing.197 It remains to be seen whether the right
to counsel will be granted for all such hearings.
An examination of the law concerning waivers does not satisfactorily
explain the purpose behind permitting such relinquishment of jurisdiction.
Several bases are suggested; that if the crime is serious enough the juvenile
court ought not to hear the case; if the juvenile is arrogant he should be
taught a lesson; or if he is a repeated offender his case is probably hopeless,
and he is better "punished" than "treated." However, these arguments
may all be boilerplate, masking the real concern behind waiver. Under
almost all juvenile court statutes incarceration is permitted only until age
twenty-one. 198 In cases involving sixteen or seventeen year old delinquents
who are repeated offenders or who have committed serious offenses such
as murder or assault with a deadly weapon, the fear of unleashing these
persons on society in three or four years may be real. Protection to
society may reasonably be said to require that these minors be restrained
of their liberty at least until the psychologists and psychiatrists who will
work with them feel they are sufficiently rehabilitated that they are no
longer a public menace. Commonly, the permissible term of imprisonment for serious offenses is long; therefore, conviction in an ordinary
criminal court will satisfy the need for public protection, but at the expense
of making unavailable the rehabilitative facilities of the juvenile institutions
and permitting young offenders to mingle with hardened criminals in an
ordinary prison.199 The juvenile may leave a greater menace than when
he arrived. A second consideration which may underlie waiver is the
desire to protect the mass of juvenile offenders who are incarcerated from
the hardened delinquent. By criminally prosecuting the worst juveniles
they will be removed from juvenile institutions where they may exert
a harmful influence. Related to this concern is the problem presented by
198 State v. Van Buren, 29 NJ. 548, 150 A2d 649 (1959) :

The decision to retain or relinquish jurisdiction is obviously meaningful to
an alleged offender as well as to society, and hence, whatever may be thought
of the demands of due process in this situation, fairness to both suggests that
there be a hearing to aid the court in reaching a decision.
Id. at 555-56, 150 A.2d at 653.
197 State v. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565, 186 A.2d 284 (1965) ; see State v. Loray, 215
A.2d 539 (NJ. Sup. Ct 1965).
198 See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Huff
v. O'Bryant, 121 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352
(D.D.C. 1960); Ar. CODE tit. 13, § 354 (1958); D.C. CoDn ANm. § 11-1551(b)
(Supp. V, 1966).
Under California law the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor may
continue until he reaches twenty-one. But if a minor is nineteen or older at the time
of adjudication, the court may retain jurisdiction of him for two years from the date
of adjudication. CAL. W=LFARE & INST'NS CODE § 607. The California court may
hear cases concerning minors up to age twenty-one. See People v. Cavanaugh, 234
Cal. App. 2d 316, 44 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1965).
199 However, some jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, California and
New York, have special provisions for sentencing youthful offenders convicted of
offenses in the criminal courts.
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limited resources. Since there is presently a strain on juvenile court
facilities, a judge faced with a particularly difficult case might feel that a
large expenditure of time is not justified because of the low probability
of successful rehabilitation.
To deal with juveniles committing homicides, New Jersey has devised
a system which does not include waiver. In such cases a hearing similar
to a criminal trial is utilized by affording the minor the right to counsel
and by bringing in a member of the prosecuting attorney's staff to present
the state's case.200 Presumably, normal evidentiary rules apply. If the
juvenile is found guilty, the judge may sentence him for a period up to
the maximum term provided under the general law for the crime, 201 but
the juvenile has a right to be freed whenever he is sufficiently rehabilitated
to assume a normal role in society. 20 2 Apparently, juveniles convicted and
sentenced in this manner are placed in juvenile institutions, or, if placed
in penal institutions, they are somewhat segregated. Obviously it is felt
that by providing a hearing approximating a criminal trial no constitu203
If
tional problems are raised by the extended sentencing procedures.
these procedures were expanded to encompass lesser offenses and all constitutional questions were satisfied by granting a full "constitutional" trial
along with regular pre-trial protections, the need for waiver could be
totally eliminated.20 4 Of course, an enlarged and more intelligent use of
juvenile incarceratory facilities would be required.
f. Protection Against Double Jeopardy
The least litigated issue in the area of procedural protections and
constitutional rights in the juvenile courts is protection against double
jeopardy. While there is some authority going each way, the great
majority of cases hold there is no protection, and most of the contrary
authority is rather recent. People v. Silverstein °5 is the case most
frequently cited for the proposition that there is no protection against
double jeopardy in the juvenile court. In that case the minor was judged
a ward of the court on a charge of burglary and was confined to an institution for fifteen months. Upon his release he was certified back to the
juvenile court by the Youth Authority, and the court certified his case
200 N.J. 6:9-1 (b).
201 See In re Steenback, 34 N.J. 89, 186 A.2d 397 (1961) ; In re Smigelski, 30
N.J. 513, 154 A.2d 1 (1959); Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1956); N.J. REv. STAT. 2A:4-37 (Supp. 1965).
202 See In re Steenback, supra note 201, at 101-02, 167 A.2d at 403; cf. State v.
Wingler, 25 N.J. 161, 135 A.2d 468 (1957).
M Comnpare In re Smigelski's Petition, 185 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1960), with
Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1957).
204 See Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction:An Evaluation of the Process
in the Juvenile Court, 9 CRIME & DEulNQuENcY 121 (1963), calling for the abolition
of waiver.
205 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.Zd 656 (1953). See In re McDonald, 153 A.2d
651 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959) ; In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
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to the superior court for further proceedings. The juvenile was then
tried for the same crime in the superior court, an ordinary criminal tribunal,
found guilty and sentenced to a term in the state prison. The appeal
taken was denied, the court holding the protection against double jeopardy
inapplicable because the juvenile court proceedings were non-criminal.
There is a tendency in some state legislatures and rule making bodies
totally to ignore the protection against double jeopardy. Silverstein relied
on provisions of the California code permitting Youth Authority officials
to return to the juvenile court delinquents who have proved troublesome
in juvenile institutions and authorizing the juvenile court to certify these
delinquents to the criminal courts. 20 6 Under the New Jersey rules of
court, the juvenile court may refer a minor to criminal courts any time
before "final disposition" regardless of how far the hearing may have
progressed. 207 The rule continues: "The hearing before the court shall
then be construed as preliminary in nature to determine whether the complaint should be referred to the prosecutor or retained by the court." 208
The Alabama code permits waiver "after thorough investigation or exercise
of [the juvenile court's] disciplinary measures." 20 9
United States v. Dickerson,2 10 decided in 1958 by the District Court
for the District of Columbia, is possibly the first clear-cut holding that
protection against double jeopardy obtains in the juvenile court. After
Dickerson was arrested on a charge of robbery he was brought before a
juvenile court where he admitted the facts stated in the petition, such an
admission being tantamount to a guilty plea. The case was continued
for social study and recommendation for disposition. In the meantime,
the boy was placed in the District of Columbia Receiving Home. Two
weeks later the court waived its jurisdiction, and the grand jury returned
an indictment charging Dickerson with robbery. The district court then
granted a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of double
jeopardy. The opinion eschewed the criminal-non-criminal distinction,
holding that the right not to be put twice in jeopardy "is present in any
proceeding and in any tribunal if the liberty of the individual is involved." 211 The court then found that jeopardy attached when the minor
212
acknowledged his guilt before the court. The court of appeals reversed,
but not on the ground that jeopardy can never attach in a juvenile court;
rather it found that jeopardy did not attach under the circumstances because the proceedings never passed the preliminary hearing stage.
A 1963 Texas litigation resulted in an unreversed holding that in
effect jeopardy may attach in a juvenile court. 213 The circumstances are
20

6 See CAL. WErLARE & INsT'Ns CODE § 707.
207 N.J. RuILEs 6:9-7.
208 Ibid.
13, § 364 (1958).
209 ALA. CODE tit.
210 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958).
21 Id. at 901.
212 United States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C.
21 8

Cir. 1959).
Garza v. State, 369 S.W2d 36 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1963).
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particularly shocking. The minor, accused of committing a homicide, was
at the time of the offense only five or six months short of seventeen, the
upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction in Texas. The district attorney attempted to obtain a nonsuit in the juvenile court before any
formal proceedings began because he desired to prosecute in a regular court
when the minor reached seventeen. This motion was overruled, and when
the case came to trial the district attorney filed a motion to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction, which was overruled, followed by a motion for continuance, also overruled. The district attorney then proceeded to plead
"under fear of contempt of court and attending penalties," stating: "We feel
that by continuing to proceed in this juvenile hearing that we would
thereafter be precluded to try this juvenile as an adult within 5 or 6
months from now." 214 After a hearing in the juvenile court at which
the minor was found to have committed the act, he was committed to a
state school for boys where he remained until he reached seventeen. At
that time he was indicted for the same crime in the regular criminal court,
where he was convicted and sentenced to seven years in jail. The conviction was reversed by the criminal court of appeals as a violation of the
principles of fundamental fairness and a deprivation of due process under
the fourteenth amendment.
It is indefensible that a juvenile, as in Silverstein, could be deprived
of his liberty for well over a year following one adjudication, and then
be retried for the same crime and sent to another institution for a second
term. It is indeed paradoxical that our system would not permit this
to happen to an adult.

III.

GENERAL CRITICISMS

A great deal may be written about juvenile court procedures affording less protection to the young criminal offender than the general criminal
system affords his elder counterpart. Up to this point, however, this Comment has not directly attacked the validity of the assumptions which
underlie the whole juvenile court system. In the preceding pages it was
suggested that the price the juvenile is forced to pay outweighs the claimed
benefits supporting informality. Now the arguments supporting informality
and the abolition of procedural protections must be examined.
Are juvenile courts non-criminal? We know that they have obvious
similarities to criminal courts; persons are tried before them for anti-social
acts commonly referred to as crimes, and if those persons are found to
have committed the acts, the court has the power to deprive them of
their liberty for a period of time. But what of the argument that criminal
courts punish while juvenile courts treat, and criminal convictions stigmatize while juvenile court litigation does not?
214

Id. at 37.
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Criticism has been heaped upon the juvenile institutions. The following are examples of the commentary:
The appearance and meaning of a reformatory to a child may not
correspond with the judicial label of "protection." Most reform
schools are no more than junior prisons, with the same restraint
of action as is found in a large measure of adult penal institutions,
both state and federal. Moreover, it is well known that when the
child returns to society after a period of "treatment" in a reforma215
tory, his opportunities are definitely jeopardized.
There are things going on, methods of discipline used in the
state training schools of this country, that would cause the warden
of Alcatraz to lose his job if he used them on his prisoners.
There are practices that are a daily occurrence in some of our
state training schools that are not permitted in the prisons or
penitentiaries of some states. There are many states in which
the discipline is more humane, more reasonable, in the prison
than it is in the state training school.216
The most blatant discrepancy between theory and practice
occurs in the character of the custodial or treatment institutions.
It is charged that most reform schools are little more than
prisons, dominated by fear and repression. Where corporal and
other degrading punishments are used, the schools are considerably worse than the average maximum security prisons. At least
for some of these adolescents confinement in what amounts to a
prison will be the second such experience in the course of the
same case since it is reported that many adolescents are detained
2 17
in jails awaiting trial.
If the above statements relate an accurate picture of the state of juvenile
institutions, and there is little published material to refute them, then
to say that juvenile court litigation will not result in punishment similar
in nature to that used against adult criminals is mere self-deception.
Is it true that the stigma of criminality does not attach in juvenile
court litigation? On this subject a California court has said:
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a
minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of a crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is
215 Rappeport, Determination of Delinquency in the Juvenile Court: A Suggested
Approach, 1958 WAsH. U.L.Q. 123, 126-27.
2 16
Id. at 126 n.8, citing MacCormick, The Essentials of a Training School Pro-

grain, in
(1950).

NATIONAL CouNcn. OF JUvENIE COURT JUDGES, PITTSBURGH CONFERENCE

50

217 Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 12-13.
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a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing
violence to reason. The courts cannot and will not shut their
2 18
eyes and ears to everyday contemporary happenings.
As noted before, statutes provide that official stigmas resulting from
criminal conviction will not be placed on the juvenile offender.2 19 He
will not, for example, be barred from civil service positions. 2 0 Juvenile
courts also attempt to keep court records confidential and private hearings
may help to lessen publicity. But public stigmas are not the only ones
that attach to criminal litigation; subtle, and not so subtle, methods have
been devised to circumvent the confidentiality of juvenile court litigation.
Most evidence points to the fact that juvenile offenders, especially
those who have served time in a reformatory, experience difficulties in
securing employment, economic advancement, admission to schools and
colleges, professional opportunities and even opportunities in the armed
services.221 Many employers have devised methods of obtaining information concerning a prospective employee's juvenile record. They may
coerce the job applicant into signing a request to the juvenile court for
release of his record by making the signing of such a release a prerequisite
for further consideration. 2 2 Application forms are also used for obtaining information. Many forms do not stop at questioning "have you ever
been arrested" or "have you ever been convicted of any crime," but
proceed to inquire "have you ever been taken into custody" and "have
you appeared in any court."
22 4
Additionally, while statutes provide for control of court records,
there have been virtually no attempts to control police records. 2 5 In
many jurisdictions the police maintain complete records of every contact
with a juvenile and sometimes a duplicate is kept in a central index
available to other police agencies. In almost all jurisdictions police have
complete discretion as to the control of these records, and some frequently
release information to those who request it-including law enforcement
agencies, the armed forces, the F.B.I., social service agencies and private
employers. 22 6 Apparently, the only state which has attempted to deal
218 Il re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789,

241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).

219

See note 37 supra and accompanying text.

220

See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308(d) (Supp. V, 1966).

Antieau, Constitutioial Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 237, 389
(1961). See In re Schubert, 153 Cal. App. 2d 138, 141, 313 P2d 968, 970 (1957),
where the trial judge amended the petition so that the conduct charged was a misdemeanor instead of the felony: "This was so the boy could enlist in the armed
services if he wanted to. Minors whose records show participation in felonies are
not welcomed in the army or navy."
221

22

See Harvard Research Project 799-800.

223 Ibid.
224 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-1586 (Supp. V, 1966).
225 See Harvard Research Project 784.
226
Id. at 785.
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with this problem is New York, where control of police records is lodged
22 7
in the juvenile courts.
If juvenile court litigation can result in punishment similar to punishment for crime, and stigma does attach to juvenile court litigation, what
is left to support the contention that informal procedures are all that is
necessary in the juvenile court? There is a real danger that informal
procedures will distort the fact-finding process, and the fear that abusive
treatment will be accorded the juvenile is not unfounded. The last argument remaining to the defenders of informality is that the hearing is part
of the treatment, removing the juvenile from the traumatic experience
of a criminal trial. Even if this were true, the obvious objection is that
the system pays a high price for the return. But is it true? It is at
least arguable that orderly, formal procedures will also have a therapeutic
effect in demonstrating the dignity and fairness of the law to the juvenile
offender and impressing him with the seriousness of his act. After the
traumatic experiences of being arrested and going through the police
process, how much more traumatic could any type of hearing be?
As long as juvenile courts are considered courts of law, they should
so act, and it may not fairly be said that they are not criminal when
they serve essentially the same function as criminal courts. juvenile
courts are not given supervisory power over all juveniles. Before a
minor may be brought under the processes of that court the commission
of an anti-social act, commonly referred to as a crime, must be proven.
There is no excuse for requiring less than legally reliable proof of the act
and fair procedures for presenting and evaluating such proof.
IV.

ANOTHER PROPOSAL

While there are grounds for criticizing the system as it now operates, the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile courts should not be
abandoned. There is always hope that money will be spent to hire more
and better personnel to staff the training schools and that repressive
measures will be minimized. The purpose of this proposal is to suggest
a system which retains the basic philosophy while establishing procedural
protections consistent with current concepts of criminal justice. For purposes of clarity the model system will be described as if it presently existed.
Juvenile courts act as criminal courts. Once that piece of underbrush is cleared away, it is not so difficult to propose that the juvenile
offender be given the same constitutional and procedural safeguards that
are given to adult offenders. It might then be asked, if juveniles are to
227 All police records relating to the arrest and disposition of any person

under this article shall be kept in files separate and apart from the arrests
of adults and shall be withheld from public inspection, but such records shall
be open to inspection upon good cause shown by the parent, guardian, next
friend or attorney of that person upon written order of a judge of the family
court . ...

N.Y.

FAmm.y CT. Acr

§ 784.
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be tried under the same procedures as adults, why not merely abolish
juvenile courts? The answer to this question must be held in abeyance
until the dispositive function of the juvenile court is discussed.
Under the model system pre-trial procedures with certain modifications
are the same as those used in cases concerning adults. The modifications
are of the type needed to make adjustment to the special nature of the
suspect involved. For example, the juvenile at all times prior to trial
must be separated from other criminal suspects if he remains incarcerated
during any part of that period. Also, a member of the probation department of the juvenile court must be notified upon arrest of a juvenile,
and he must supervise all pre-trial detention and interrogation of the
accused. The juvenile is afforded and informed of a right to counsel and,
in the case of indigents, is offered appointment, following the same procedure used for adults in the jurisdiction. If the child is incapable of
understanding the need for a lawyer, his parents are informed of the
right. In cases where there is a conflict of interest between the parent
and child, or where the judge finds that the parents are not capable of
protecting the child's interests, he may appoint counsel to represent the
child. The right to have bail set is extended.
The prosecutor assumes his normal function of presenting the state's
case under regular rules of evidence. Since the prosecutor must try the
case, he has joint responsibility with the probation officer to decide
whether prosecution is appropriate. If indictment by grand jury is
provided in the jurisdiction for adults, it is also provided for juveniles.
The use of confessions must be carefully scrutinized, and the constitutional standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
and state courts concerning confessions and right to counsel must be
applied. A pre-trial hearing is provided where the legality of a confession may be attacked, and confessions must be suppressed if shown to be
improperly obtained. Similarly, constitutional interpretations and rulings
in the jurisdiction concerning searches and seizures are fully applied.
The differentiation of the dispositive from the fact-finding function
plays a major role in the new hearing procedure, since the intermingling
of the two in one bearing has caused so many problems in the past. A
bifurcated hearing, totally separating the two functions, is provided.
During the fact-finding hearing, the right to trial by jury is granted, the
strict rules of evidence apply, the juvenile is warned of his right not to
incriminate himself, testimony is given only by sworn witnesses and counsel has the normal right of cross-examination. As previously mentioned, instead of the probation officer or the judge carrying the burden
of presenting the state's case, the prosecutor assumes his usual role.
If a judge is sitting without jury, he is not permitted to read any
material concerning the dispositive function, including social records
and probation reports. Of course, under no circumstances is evidence
concerning the dispositive function permitted in the fact-finding hearing,
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and the only situations where material relevant to that function might
be presented are cases in which it is also relevant to the factual question
before the court and admissible under the rules of evidence. The right
to public trial is granted, but the child or his parent or guardian may request a private hearing after the court explains this option. After evidence
is heard, the jury, or judge where jury trial is waived, announces a verdict
or judgment under the ordinary burden of proof in criminal casesproof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jeopardy attaches at the same
point it does in any criminal trial.
If the juvenile has been found to have committed the crime alleged,
a dispositive hearing is held after a continuance during which the judge
familiarizes himself with the entire record of the minor, what is known
of his past and all social and psychological reports. Both the juvenile's
counsel and the prosecutor may have access to these records as a matter
of right,228 but otherwise confidentiality is generally preserved.

Counsel

for each side may submit material relevant to the disposition of the
minor. The conduct of the dispositive hearing approximates present
procedures utilized in most juvenile court hearings. The rules of evidence
are greatly relaxed and all material relevant to the issue of what type of
disposition is best for the juvenile is admissible. The judge is free to
call witnesses he feels would aid in the determination, and he may be
liberal in questioning from the bench. Cross-examination by counsel
should be restrained and aimed solely at ascertaining what type of disposition would be best for the juvenile and society.
Confidentiality of all records is maintained, and only those having
a direct interest in the litigation or the general welfare of the child are
permitted to inspect them. This group would include parents, guardians,
close relatives and officers of the court engaged in litigation concerning
the child. Control of records, including files kept by the police, is the
function solely of the juvenile court judge.
It is in the dispositive function that the expertise of a specialist
judge is most useful; indeed, this special skill is the major reason for
maintaining a separate juvenile court system. Sentencing in the juvenile
court should be geared mainly toward the rehabilitation of the juvenile,
with a secondary consideration being protection of the public. Punishment and deterrence should play a minor role. Thus, the seriousness of the
offense is not nearly so important in sentencing in a juvenile court as in a
normal criminal court. A judge who is trained or who trains himself
in social sciences and deals with many juvenile offenders will almost of
necessity develop a greater understanding of the problems involved than
228 This proposal adopts a somewhat expanded version of the rule announced in
Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Under it, the juvenile
offender is granted greater access to these records than Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949), seems to give adults. The most valid objection to wide-open disclosure is that it will deter persons from giving information to probation officers.
If this in fact occurs, the proposal will require modification.
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a judge who deals with a broad range of cases. If we desire a specialist
in the dispositive function, the same group of men ought to preside over
the fact-finding hearings to save duplication. If it were otherwise, the
specialist judge would be required to waste time and effort familiarizing
himself with the events at the prior hearing, and would be deprived of
observing the juvenile's demeanor at the hearing.
Under the proposed system the juvenile court judge is generally given
great leeway in sentencing. Presently, a juvenile may be incarcerated
only until age twenty-one, no matter how dangerous he may be and no
matter what the chances for early rehabilitation. This limited incarceration is required because the minor is not given a "constitutional" trial.
The proposed system permits longer incarceration because full constitutional rights have been granted.
In any case the juvenile may be sentenced to an institution up to the
maximum period allowed under the criminal law for the crime committed
and has the right to be released sooner when the juvenile authorities find
he is sufficiently rehabilitated to take his place in society. As a check
against arbitrary refusal to permit a rehabilitated offender to leave the
institution, the juvenile court must periodically review cases of incarcerated
juvenile offenders. This review must be made no less than every three
to five years. In sentencing, the primary concern is the needs of the
juvenile, but the judge must also consider the needs of society.
The suggested system totally obviates the need for waiver of jurisdiction if juvenile institutions are intelligently used and new ones established where necessary. By permitting longer periods of incarceration,
the public will be protected against premature release of dangerous juvenile
offenders. The difficulties of operating a system of juvenile institutions
would be complicated, but by segregating roughly along age levels and
by sorting out the more disturbed inmates from the others, most problems
can be solved if sufficient financial resources are made available.

